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Beyond the Billion Dollar Headlines: A Realistic Look at College Endowments

March 16, 2026, By Chet Haskell – Private college and university endowments have been much in the news of late. Most of the attention has been paid to the small group of private non-profit universities with endowments in excess of $10 billion. Federal legislation has increased the tax on these very large endowments. The Trump Administration has sought – and in some cases succeeded – to get payments to “settle” claims against the university and to restore suspended Federal research funding.  But focusing on these institutions obscures some important perspectives on endowments and, by extension, their use.

What are the data?

First, the data demonstrate that the vast majority of endowment assets in American higher education are held by a small percentage of wealthy institutions. According to IPEDS data corroborated by the annual NACUBO Commonfund survey, there are only 16 institutions with endowments in excess of $10 billion. These represent a tiny fraction (1.3 percent) of the 1243 private institutions with endowments (and another 328 without endowments). Yet, together they represent more than 50% of all endowments in terms of dollar value ($326.4 billion of a national total of $638.1 billion).

There are another 79 institutions with reported endowments in excess of $1 billion, representing 6.4% of the institutions and 29.9 percent of the national total. There are also 41 institutions with endowments between $500 million and $1 billion. Thus, together, these 136 institutions control total endowment assets in excess of $548 billion. Put differently, these institutions represent 10.9% of all private institutions with endowments, but also control 85.9% of all private endowment dollars.

At the next level, there are 295 institutions with more than $100 million and less than $500 million in endowments. These average $220 million and represent 10.6% of the national total.

Together, the 430 institutions with endowments in excess of $100 million represent 34.6 percent of all private institutions and a staggering 96.2% of total national endowments.

At the lowest level, the 813 institutions with small endowments (less than $100 million, averaging $30 million) are in essence holding almost nothing. They represent 65% of all private colleges, but hold only 3.8% of national endowment assets. This situation is dire for many reasons. These 813 institutions are financially insecure and may lack the resources or the scale to improve their positions independently. They are most at risk to join the growing list of institutional closures. Many of these institutions are venerable anchors of small communities and have played an important role in the diverse ecosystem of American higher education. They have a wide range of missions, specializations, and academic offerings. Yet, they almost uniformly lack the financial basics for longer-term security.

As will be argued below, the 295 institutions with endowments in excess of $100 million (average endowments of $220 million) are also at risk, given the changing demographics and economics of the higher education landscape. While these institutions are unlikely to collapse completely, they are under significant pressure to change their strategies and to consider the impacts of what many observers have dubbed a “coming era of consolidation.”

A final note about very small institutions. IPEDS also identifies 328 institutions without any endowment. Most are tiny specialized or religious colleges, and others have already announced pending closure.

There are also large endowments among some of the public institutions or systems. NACUBO identifies the following examples. There are eight public entities with endowments in excess of $5 billion for a total of $138.7 billion and an average of $17.3 billion. (These data are skewed by the University of Texas Systems $48 billion endowment, much of which comes from State oil revenues.)

The principal difference between these endowments and those of the private institutions is not size, but another measurement: endowment per student. The eight top public institutions have an average per student endowment of $267 thousand, while the eight top private institutions have per student endowments averaging $1.94 million. This perspective will be discussed further below.

What are the limitations of endowments?

First, we must be clear about what endowments are and are not. Endowments, whatever the size, are not simply a pot of money an institution can dip into as needed. Instead, almost all endowments are restricted in various ways as to their use. According to NACUBO, approximately 48% of endowments are restricted to student financial aid purposes. This is of obvious importance, as such aid not only attracts students and facilitates enrollments, but also represents real cash going into an institution’s operating budget. Such aid is of particular importance at a time when most private institutions are discounting their tuition by 50% or more.

There are many other forms of restriction. Buildings, faculty positions, specific programs, and even football coaches are often funded from restricted endowments. Again, these specific purposes limit an institution’s flexibility, especially in times of financial crisis. In effect, a college or university endowment is a pool of separate endowments, each with its own restrictions and purposes. However, neither these funds nor their generated incomes are typically fungible for budgetary purposes.

There are examples of institutional donor-funded endowments that are not restricted to particular uses. These represent a small minority of endowed funds, as most donors have a particular purpose for their gift. Finally, as discussed below, there is a category of quasi-endowments where the institution has decided to fence in certain assets as a form of reserve fund controlled by an institution’s board.

The fundamental concept behind endowments is support of an institution’s mission and existence over long time periods (and the “perpetuity nature” of most endowments is designed as support over VERY long times). While providing funding for the future is an important aspect of institutional sustainability, restricting funding purposes may be counterproductive. Specific purposes – or indeed, institutions themselves – may have no relevance today or in the future. Should institutions exist forever? Should they always maintain the same purposes? Should the restricted purposes continue forever?

Institutions seeking to modify or repurpose a restricted endowment face significant challenges. The guiding principle is the intent of the original donors in making the endowment gift. With donor concurrence, a change in restrictions is simple. However, the donors of many endowments may wish to permit such changes or may not even be alive to consider doing so. In such cases, an institution must get the approvals of probate courts and, in some cases, state Attorneys General, a time-consuming and difficult process.

How do endowments affect budgets?

The traditional rule of thumb for most institutions is to limit the actual use of endowments to a portion of the income generated annually. A common metric is 5% of the value of the endowment. In other words, an endowment of $50 million will be expected to generate roughly 5% or less ($2.5 million) for annual expenditure purposes. Even this is limited, as most institutions try to reinvest income into capital in order to maintain value. If, as in recent years, an endowment actually generates more than 5%, the institution may choose to utilize or recapitalize the excess.

While the wealthy institutions have more capacity to exceed 5% returns and thus decide strategies,  5% is the general rule for smaller institutions. However, as Robert Kelchen points out in a recent blog, more and more schools have increased the draw on their endowments. Of 1202 institutions he studies, in 2024, 43% spent between 4% and 6%. In other words, they spent within the range of the general metric. At the same time, 8% of institutions spent more than 10%. And 13% spent zero, as most of these were tiny institutions with less than $5 million in endowment. (Kelchen citation)

And the $2.5 million in this illustrative example represents multiple purposes and is of limited fungibility. Most likely, half is dedicated to student financial aid. Again, this is important because it represents “real” money, as opposed to discounted aid. Endowment funded student aid contributes dollar for dollar to institutional net tuition revenue, whereas discounted aid means a reduction in net tuition revenue. And for all smaller institutions, net tuition revenues (an effective measure of the value of enrollments) is the coin of the realm.

But using $1.25 million for aid means there is only a similar amount available for all other budget purposes. In a typical operating budget of $80 million, this represents less than 2% of needed revenue. Helpful, but not decisive in financial terms.

Another key concept for endowments (and gifts in general) is whether or not they are substitutional – they pay for a necessary expense (like faculty), thus freeing up tuition dollars for other purposes. A properly funded faculty chair for an essential faculty member “relieves” the general budget from having to fund it. And tuition dollars, once received, can be used for any purpose the institution deems proper.

Unfortunately, many institutions have accepted restricted gifts that are incremental in budget terms – they add to the expense budget. The classic example is the endowment gift for a new facility that does not cover the true cost of ongoing facility maintenance. Or an endowment creates a new program that simply is not fully funded, thus requiring subsidization from other budget resources.

In short, in almost every case, endowments are not the answer to institutional funding challenges. Yes, they can contribute to the bottom line, but it takes a very large endowment to relieve institutions of the need for enrollments and tuition revenue. Indeed, endowments can be a kind of buffer against reality when institutions feel secure in their endowment and fail to take forward-looking strategic decisions.

Even the very largest endowments do not always protect the institutions. During the dramatic stock market declines in 2008-2009, some of the wealthiest institutions cut expenses, laying off employees and shuttering programs. Why? If endowment income covers 20% of the $2 billion operating budget of an institution and that income falls by half, that institution suddenly has a $200 million hole in its annual budget.

There is a category of institutional surpluses often called “quasi-endowments.” An institution fortunate to have a cash surplus may decide to set it aside from regular considerations by imposing board of trustee restrictions on its use. This prudent measure enables an institution to protect such a fund while reserving the capacity for the board to lift restrictions if it so wishes.

The absence of such cash reserves is an Achilles heel for many smaller institutions. If annual financial success is defined as a balanced operating budget, the institution will face difficulty if harder times come unexpectedly or if an opportunity for growth through investment arises. Every institution should do all it can to create cash reserves, even if very modest in scale. Doing so is an indicator of fiscal probity that may provide some room for maneuver either to deal with a crisis or to fund an investment.

What are the strategic considerations?

A rhetorical question that should face every president and CFO is: Would you rather have endowment gifts or current use gifts? Would you rather have a $10 million endowment gift that will generate $500,000 every year in perpetuity or would you rather have three annual current use gifts of $3.3 million? If your short-term future is under stress, the endowment income may be of limited utility, whereas the larger current use income may enable you to make investments or changes necessary to ensure enrollment growth and sustainability.

The strategic plans of most smaller institutions often call for establishing endowed funds of a certain scale. This may not be the best strategy. In the first instance, endowment gifts usually require long periods of engagement and cultivation with potential donors, and time is not on the side of institutions under pressure. While most institutions are unlikely to decline a sizeable endowment gift unless it is truly incremental or it would skew the basic mission, institutions based on enrollments (namely, almost all) must be able to have funding to invest in initiatives designed to grow those enrollments in the near term. An announced strategic goal of establishing an endowment of $100 million may be laudable. But even if achieved, it may not be sufficient to help short-term budgets.

There are examples of smaller institutions engaging in significant capital campaigns that involve a mixture of longer-term endowment objectives. These include restricted endowments for purposes like scholarships or faculty positions and unrestricted funds, as well as amounts of current use non-endowed funds. This type of approach can be successful if there is a strong alumni donor base and there are opportunities for very large gifts. But as all academic development staff know, preparation for such a campaign takes tremendous seedwork and preparation. This approach is unlikely to be successful with institutions lacking a long-term donor engagement and cultivation record.

Another more subjective possibility is the degree to which a commitment to such a campaign strengthens the institution. Perhaps large gifts stimulate other large gifts. Perhaps the raised profile of an institution and its avowed direction encourages potential students choose to enroll. A basic purpose of such a campaign is to make an institution more attractive to students, including through such objectives as new facilities, increased scholarship aid or new programs. It is difficult to imagine a capital campaign that does not also seek to encourage enrollment growth.

The reality – as is often said – is that the three most important things for private higher education are enrollments, enrollments, and enrollments. Sustaining and building enrollments is a complex, Herculean task in an extremely competitive environment. Focusing on enrollment growth – and specifically, net tuition revenue growth – must be the highest priority. The more than 800 institutions with endowments smaller than $100 million are not going to be saved by anything except enrollment growth. Gifts and endowments are positive, but rarely make the survivability difference for smaller institutions.

Conclusion

Indeed, in the context of the current undergraduate demographic decline and the rising costs of providing competitive higher education program, it is hard not to conclude that many smaller institutions will either find some form of partnership or merger in order to achieve economies of scale and resources or they will fail.

The 295 institutions with endowments between $100 million and $500 million are best placed to control their destinies, not because their endowments alone will sustain them, but because they have sufficient resources to buy some time and implement new strategies. Their resources will likely provide opportunities for them to initiate partnerships or to absorb other, weaker partners.  But it is incumbent upon their leadership to be clear-eyed about their strategies and the implementation of these plans.

The 813 institutions with endowments less than $100 million have much less room to maneuver. One possibility is to seek a partnership where they are acquired or are the junior partner. Another is to try to band together with like institutions to build scale. However, it will become increasingly difficult for these institutions to “go it alone.” In the absence of significant enrollment growth, they will always be at high risk.

There is an important potential role for philanthropy here. One example is the Transformational Partnerships Fund, the supporters of which include the Kresge Foundation. This Fund seeks to encourage partnerships between institutions by providing grants for technical, legal, and consulting resources, although their maximum grant of $100,000 is clearly insufficient, especially for institutions already in significant financial trouble. Another example is the State of New Jersey program to encourage consolidation of institutions in that State. The fact of the matter is that it is expensive and time-consuming to plan and consummate a partnership agreement in any circumstance. The institutions most in need of such partnerships are likely the institutions with the least financial capacity to accomplish this.

The coming era of institutional consolidation will favor those institutions that are looking forward in coldly realistic ways. Increased endowments will not provide the difference between success and failure for most institutions. Growing net tuition revenue is the key, and this can only be accomplished through effective enrollment growth combined with sensible expense decisions. And for most institutions, this will mean finding ways to increase scale through some form of partnership or consolidation. The alternatives are grim.

Dr. Chet Haskell serves as Co-Head for the College Partnerships and Alliances for the Edu Alliance Group. Chet is a higher education leader with extensive experience in academic administration, institutional strategy, and governance. He recently completed six and a half years as Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs and University Provost at Antioch University, where he played a central role in creating the Coalition for the Common Good with Otterbein University.

Earlier in his career, he spent 13 years at Harvard University in senior academic positions, including Executive Director of the Center for International Affairs and Associate Dean of the Kennedy School of Government. He later served as Dean of the College at Simmons College and as President of both the Monterey Institute of International Studies and Cogswell Polytechnical College, successfully guiding both institutions through mergers.

An experienced consultant, Dr. Haskell has advised universities and ministries of education in the United States, Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East on issues of finance, strategy, and accreditation. His teaching and research have focused on leadership and nonprofit governance, with a particular emphasis on helping smaller institutions adapt to financial and structural challenges.
He earned DPA and MPA degrees from the University of Southern California, an MA from the University of Virginia, and an AB cum laude from Harvard University.

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Issues of Institutional Governance in Partnerships

March 2, 2026, By Chet Haskell– Institutional governance – its form, structures, members, by-laws, and responsibilities – is an essential element of any organization. The manner by which missions are defined how decisions are made about personnel, programs, policies, and finances is crucial in every corporate and non-profit setting.

Clarity about governance is especially important in the highly regulated world of private higher education, where accrediting bodies have standards that control most aspects of institutional life, including, crucially, access to Federal government Title IV student aid, the lifeblood of most colleges and universities.

The principal accrediting bodies permit a range of possible governance models beyond that of the traditional single independent college or university. But they all come down to clarity about organizational structures and the processes by which decisions are made. For example, the WASC Senior College and University Commission (WSCUC) highlights the key features of a governance model for such an institution as:

Operating with “appropriate autonomy governed by an independent board or similar authority that is responsible for mission, integrity and oversight of planning, policies, performance and sustainability”. (From Accreditation Standard 3 WSCUC)

Types of Partnerships and Governance Challenges

But how does this apply and play out in more complex organizational models? A growing number of independent institutions are engaging in (or seeking to engage in) a variety of partnership models that range from consortia to outright mergers or acquisitions. There also are efforts aimed at a middle path between a relatively simple sharing of services and complete absorption of one into another. This essay will explore some of these models, always keeping in mind basic governance principles.

A successful partnership between two academic institutions requires alignment in many areas. First, of course, the financial aspects of a potential agreement must come together. The numbers must add up and work to both partners’ advantage. The deal must pencil out.

But much more is involved than straightforward budgeting matters. There are two additional broad alignments that are necessary. One is the alignment of missions and cultures. This is essential in higher education if the multiple constituencies of any institution are to be engaged. The other is implementation. It is one thing to reach a deal. It is another to implement it, especially since making an agreement a reality is fraught with complexities, external requirements such as accreditation and the natural emotions inherent in any such plan.

Sometimes two or more institutions to agree to cost-sharing arrangements and other agreements that fall short of complete institutional involvement. There are, after all, numerous examples of multi-school consortia around the country, where cooperating institutions come to mutually beneficial arrangements while maintaining their full institutional independence. Two examples are the Claremont Consortium and the Community Solution Education System (formerly The Chicago School). As will be will be discussed below, despite being very different in formal structure, these and many other like arrangements seek to gain advantages through cooperation without ceding full institutional independence

However, moving beyond such cooperative ventures requires resolution of a variety of institutional governance challenges. The traditional model of American higher education assumes unitary institutional control resting in the hands of a self-replicating fiduciary board of trustees. As noted, this model is underscored by the standards of accrediting bodies (and, usually, state laws as well), which require clarity as to a board’s roles and structures.

Non-profit college and university boards are composed of volunteers, often alumni of the institution at hand. Indeed, paid trustees are usually forbidden. These individuals bring many things to the institution –expertise, connections, money, experienced guidance – as part of their commitment and service. There are thousands of examples of the essential contributions of these dedicated parties.

Faced with situations of institutional crisis– almost always financial in nature –these volunteer boards hold in their hands the interests and futures of students, faculty, staff, alumni and many others. Decisions they make may enable an institution to prosper and continue independently. Failure to make the right decisions may well lead to institutional closure. In times of such crisis, it often makes sense for boards to look for partnership arrangements that often lead to merger or acquisition with another institution.

Partnerships and Organizational Change

More likely is some form of merger or acquisition or similar arrangement that has one vital characteristic: a change in institutional governance, including at the board level.  As noted above, financial arrangements are necessary, but not sufficient requirements. The actual process of assessing mission and cultural fit between two institutions is much more difficult and is at the heart of any partnership with a chance of success. And even if those two conditions are met, the complex and time-consuming task of implementation requires leadership, patience and continued effort.

The board of trustees of each institution is central to all of these steps. It is here that the structure of governance is so important. In almost all cases, the role of an institution’s board will change and successful change is necessary for a successful partnership.

Mergers of two institutions are common. And even if outright acquisition is not the case, there is always a senior or dominating partner. This partner will be the financially stronger institution and, as elsewhere, those who have the gold make the rules.

While there are limited examples of true equal partnerships in higher education, the much more common model calls for one institution to cede most, if not all, of its independence to another. If the situation is an acquisition, the acquired institution will lose its independent board as it is absorbed by the other. While an advisory committee or other fig leaf arrangement may continue, the acquiring institution is fully and legally in charge and thus fully responsible for making the acquisition work.

There may be certain adjustments designed to assure the interests of the more junior institution, such as some seats on the senior institution’s board, the establishment of an entity to carry on the junior institution’s name or the transfer of certain key personnel. Sometimes there are separate endowed funds.

Crucially, the smaller institution will cease to exist legally. Its name, programs, mission and people may continue in the new structure. For example, University of Health Sciences and Pharmacy St. Louis very recently announced its acquisition by Washington University St. Louis. The latter will close the non-pharmacy elements of the former and will integrate the pharmacy programs as “its College of Pharmacy.”  The pharmacy program will continue but  University of Health Sciences St. Louis and its fiduciary board will disappear. This is common in the many cases of absorption of all or part of one institution into another.

Giving up institutional independence and control is a dilemma: become part of something bigger or face possible closure. While no institution wants to close, boards are responsible for the interests of students first and thus generally will seek a partnership solution, even if it means the end of the institution’s independence and governance.

Entering into a merger situation is not a decision to be taken lightly and is fraught with difficulty for the more junior partner. Students face disruption and change. Faculty and staff members usually face the possibility of losing their jobs, as the senior institution is unlikely to integrate the junior institution without changes. Alumni are usually distraught as part of their identity fades away. Some people may wish to fight the agreement with last-ditch (and usually unsuccessful) efforts to find an alternative path. The communities in which the institution is located will worry about the implications of change for the local economy, local institutions and citizens.

The institution’s board of trustees must deal with all this change, uncertainty, loss and, in many cases, anger. Since many trustees may be alumni, they have particularly strong emotional connections. And, at the end of the day, most such partnerships lead to the dissolution of one board. While board dissolution is also the outcome of a closure, a board can and should take solace in being able to steer the institution into a safer harbor.

There have been efforts to move towards cooperative arrangements that do not require board dissolution. A noted, there are examples of mergers of equals. One of the best known is Case Western Reserve University founded in 1967 through a merger of Western Reserve (founded 1826) and Case Institute of Technology (1880). Other examples include Carnegie Mellon University (1967), University of Detroit Mercy (1980), and Washington and Jefferson C(1865).

In another case, Atlanta University (1865) and Clark College (1879) were independent parts of the Atlanta University Center, a consortium also involving Morehouse, Spelman and Morris Brown Colleges, as well as Gammon Seminary. In 1988, Atlanta University and Clark College consolidated to become Clark Atlanta University, primarily a research institution that serves as the graduate school for the other Atlanta University Center members.

Nevertheless, such mergers of equals have not been the case in recent years. Instead, the growing financial challenges and the increased regulatory requirements have made such a model rare.

The development of consortia has been a characteristic of groups of institutions with shared interests and opportunities for savings and efficiencies through shared service agreements, as well as expanded academic opportunities for students. The Claremont Consortium involves seven co-located institutions that share various administrative services, facilities and the like, while working together to increase student options. (Their motto is: “Seven Institutions, Infinite Choices.” At the same time, they always operate as independent colleges with separate boards and accreditation. Variations on this model can be found in other consortia nationally.

A somewhat different example is the Community Solution Education System (CSES), which includes six separate, institutions, but serves as the single provider of a wide range of services including information technology, marketing, enrollment management, admissions support, and related services, all  for set fees. The CSES central operation can provide such services at scale and with great effect, thereby enabling the individual schools to grow to sustainability. Again, like looser consortia arrangements, the boards of the separate schools operate independently and their accreditations are separate.

There is a recent alternative model, the Coalition for the Common Good founded by Otterbein and Antioch Universities in 2023. Designed to be more than a bilateral arrangement, the Coalition plans to expand to several partners in the coming years. The Coalition model may resemble a consortium in some ways. There is a shared services subsidiary designed for cost-sharing purposes. And, crucially, both founding institutions maintain their separate status with accreditors and the US Department of Education. This means both institutions maintain their separate boards to oversee the management of their separate operations.

Coalition activities are several. Some are simply cooperative (communication, joint non-academic initiatives). But others require true shared governance. These include the shift of academic programs and personnel and, crucially, the implementation of the financial aspects of the agreement. A central element of the Coalition model is for most Otterbein graduate programs (largely in nursing and healthcare) to shift to Antioch control. The goal is to use Antioch’s multiple locations and distance education experience to expand these programs in ways impossible for Otterbein.

The initial governance structure is a bit complex. There is a new Coalition board that has equal representation from both Otterbein and Antioch (four each) and a single independent member. This board appoints the president of the Coalition and otherwise oversees Coalition initiatives.

The straightforward model for something like the Coalition is for the separate boards to operate independently as before except for having ceded certain specified powers to the Coalition board, such as restrictions on excessive debt or certain property transactions. The umbrella Coalition board would appoint a president of the Coalition and the separate boards would appoint separate institutional presidents with the concurrence of the Coalition board.

This approach creates complex challenges as the Coalition model expands, since adding a third, fourth or fifth member on the same model would become unwieldy. This is a challenge the Coalition will have to address in negotiations with additional members.

One can readily see the difficulties with these different approaches. WSCUC, for example, addressed this in an accreditation review of Pacific Oaks College, a member of the CSES system. Noting a grey area, the WSCUC Commission called for steps “to ensure boundaries between provision of services and the management of the college are maintained.” (WASC Commission letter, March 2014) In effect, the Commission is warning about the importance of autonomy of the governing board.

Yet, the desire to collaborate will require changes and sacrifices.  This also is true in the public sector, even though the governance challenges are different. There are numerous state university multi-institution systems. For example, in California, the University of California is a unitary system of ten large and prominent units. However, there is only one Board of Regents for the entire system, along with a system president and various central systems functions.

The composite entities (UCLA, for example) have system-appointed Chancellors with significant independent powers and responsibilities for their unit within the system. They are separately accredited institutions. But they do not have separate fiduciary boards, although there are various advisory groups. The accrediting body (WSCUC) has specific standards for governance of multi-campus institutions. (Recall that the University of California predates WSCUC, as is the case with many multi-campus systems elsewhere.)

A different example is the 2022 decision of the Pennsylvania State system to impose the merger of three smaller campus units into what is now called PennWest. While in some ways similar to the merger of a small private institution, the governance issues were all within the purview of a unitary public system.

Lessons

The lessons to be drawn from this are two. First, systems of private institutions with de facto independent boards and leadership are possible, following the public sector model. Indeed, there are examples of private groups functioning in this general framework

The second is that boards seeking to assure the future of their institution will have to face certain realities. The most likely path – mergers of some sort – will mean surrendering some or all board governance in at least one of the partner institutions. Paths that result in strong partnerships with separate governance are difficult and complex, but not impossible. Creative institutions will seek to explore them and regulatory bodies should attempt to accommodate such new paths. The duty to at least explore these paths is incumbent upon any institution facing existential challenges. It is the only responsible direction in times of change and challenge. Failure to do so represents a shirking of responsibilities and, potentially, closure.

Concluding Thoughts About Accrediting Bodies

A final word about the roles of accrediting bodies in matters of merger and partnership. Accrediting bodies are sympathetic to struggling institutions, as their first responsibility always is to students. As long as they can see a way forward for a school, they try to be helpful. The same is true with state and Federal governments that certainly do not wish to see students lose educational pathways after having incurred student loan debt.

As should be clear, most parties – institutional boards, accreditors, government overseers – see mergers and partnerships as highly preferable to closures. Some observers have suggested accreditors should be able to serve as matchmakers with potential partners of a school in trouble. However, accreditors typically treat each institution in isolation and have not sought the matchmaker role. At the same time, struggling institutions are not always transparent with their accreditors. They worry that if the accreditor knew the true situation of a school in trouble, it might impose some sort of sanction that might make things worse. Complete candor with an accreditor may sometimes be feared as a way of inviting accreditor discipline, a step that will make everything harder, including finding a potential partner that will not be even more nervous about a merger possibility with a struggling school. Candor also can create self-fulfilling prophecies that accelerate crisis.

Yet it is in no one’s interest that a school should fail. Students, employees, communities, alumni and all of higher education lose. Yet, the economics and challenges today – particularly for smaller institutions – create situations where greater accreditor engagement may play crucial roles in institutional survival through enabling or facilitating some form of partnership or merger. Treating every institution as a separate case may be counterproductive in the coming era of institutional consolidation.

Everyone – not just boards of trustees or college president-should care about these challenges. Exploring and supporting different forms of partnership should be on everyone’s minds.

Dr. Chet Haskell serves as Co-Head for the College Partnerships and Alliances for the Edu Alliance Group. Chet is a higher education leader with extensive experience in academic administration, institutional strategy, and governance. He recently completed six and a half years as Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs and University Provost at Antioch University, where he played a central role in creating the Coalition for the Common Good with Otterbein University. Earlier in his career, he spent 13 years at Harvard University in senior academic positions, including Executive Director of the Center for International Affairs and Associate Dean of the Kennedy School of Government. He later served as Dean of the College at Simmons College and as President of both the Monterey Institute of International Studies and Cogswell Polytechnical College, successfully guiding both institutions through mergers.

An experienced consultant, Dr. Haskell has advised universities and ministries of education in the United States, Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East on issues of finance, strategy, and accreditation. His teaching and research have focused on leadership and nonprofit governance, with a particular emphasis on helping smaller institutions adapt to financial and structural challenges.
He earned DPA and MPA degrees from the University of Southern California, an MA from the University of Virginia, and an AB cum laude from Harvard University.