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The Soft Power Reckoning

Declining International Enrollments in US Higher Education Are a Global Matter (and Much More Than Simply a Revenue Problem for American Colleges and Universities)

June 9, 2026, by Chet Haskell and Senthil Nathan – The openness of American colleges and universities to students from other nations has long been understood as a strength. These students enhance the quality and diversity of educational programs for all students. They provide perspectives and experiences that broaden the understanding of American students. They represent significant revenue sources for both institutions and the communities in which they are located. And many stay after graduation to live and work as important elements of American society.

 The data show significant declines in international students currently seeking the necessary visas for study in the US. The decline will likely accelerate when combined with large numbers of students currently enrolled and seeking to complete their degrees. According to NAFSA, total Spring 2026 international enrollments in the US are down 20% from the previous year. The more than 1.1 million international students contributed at least $43 billion to the US economy.

At the same time, the policies and rhetoric of the current US Administration are widely seen to have had major negative impacts on American higher education. Visa restrictions, changes in duration of studies regulations and reduced university research funding all act as direct disincentives for foreign students to seek to study in the US. Other broader matters also have impacts as the world watches:  explicit attacks on higher education, shuttering of internationally oriented institution like AID, excessive immigration enforcement and the war in Iran. Finally, American actions seem to devalue the importance of its longtime allies and international cooperation more generally. “America First” is hardly an attractive slogan for attracting international students.

The implications for American colleges and universities are severe. First is the simple impact on institutional budgets as fewer international students means reduced revenues. These enrollment effects add to the revenue pressures already felt by many institutions as domestic enrollments are seen as declining in many areas. These pressures are inordinately felt by some small private institutions that also have to compete with increased efforts of public universities to enroll American students.

At the same time, different institutions are hit in different ways. For example, Moody’s a rating agency, on May 12, 2026, downgraded Columbia University’s outlook to negative citing “uncertainty about international enrollments” as a prime factor for this change. Columbia at 40% has one of the largest international student bodies in the US.

Universities with large research programs have already felt the impacts of significant reductions in government funding through cuts at agencies like the National Institutes of Health or the National Science Foundation. While such cuts affect a university as a whole, they place particular pressures on leading Carnegie R1 institutions that have attracted top foreign students into their PhD programs. One result is that most institutions, even the wealthiest, have been trimming budgets and restricting new enrollments in some graduate programs.

The top US research universities have welcomed foreign graduate students because of their desire to attract the very best talent for both their programs and for the development of future faculty. Nationality is at best a minor consideration if an institution is seeking excellence in a competitive global environment.

The longer-term implications of these actions and trends are considerable. In the first instance, the pipeline for top researchers and professors is being constricted. (Recall that PhD programs are, in effect, a workforce development program for higher education. Demonstrating one’s ability to conduct research that leads to new knowledge is fundamental to a PhD degree.) Another implication is the production of research in general. Fewer researchers with less funding will mean that groundbreaking research will be more limited with broad effects on American and global society.

US higher education was once considered the gold standard for academic excellence. The top US institutions were seen as leading the world in many ways. Their brands were highly visible and extremely attractive to foreign students at all levels. Many institutions outside the US have sought and gained US institutional accreditation as a way to validate their own quality. Many specialized accreditors like ABET were considered the absolute in best practice. Together, these perceptions and the perceived relative weakness of many universities outside the US enabled the US to attract some of the best minds in the world.

Things have changed, even before the more recent US government actions noted above. Universities in many nations have grown in scale and quality. While much of the attention has been focused on the growth of Chinese universities, there are important gains in many countries. One result is that students have options. There are excellent institutions and programs outside the US.

China and India together account for 30% of all internationally mobile students.  South Korea, Vietnam, and Nigeria are also major exporters of college students.  How do the topmost student-sending countries respond to this fast-changing US scenario? 

China, India, and Gulf nations are rapidly expanding local higher education capacity, including welcoming international branch campuses (IBCs).  China has 50 international branch campuses inside China and Hong Kong.  India, which opened the door to IBCs just three years ago, already has 30+ foreign universities (from the UK, Australia, the USA, and the like) in various stages of establishing IBCs. 

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been particularly active in the IBC space. For example, Abu Dhabi now hosts two internationally significant institutions of this type, New York University Abu Dhabi and Sorbonne University Abu Dhabi.

Dubai has encouraged IBCs and now has 37+ international branch campuses to provide alternatives for outbound students from the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and Central Asia.  The percentage of student visa rejections in Dubai is much lower than in the US, Canada, and the UK for students from these regions.  For students who are typically keen on completing a good international undergraduate education and aim to pursue an international career, the UAE offers an excellent alternative to North America, Europe, and Australia. 

A significant percentage of outbound graduate students are high-achieving and high-potential and have proven to contribute to the entrepreneurial and innovation cultures of their host countries over the past decades.  However, if such high-potential students face significant barriers unrelated to their research, they tend to find good alternatives in their home countries or elsewhere.  There is no doubt that international students who want to pursue research and related careers in the US will lose somewhat in their individual careers. However, most of these students will find career success elsewhere and the US will be the aggregate loser.

In this context, the significant growth in international students in Germany, particularly in STEM fields, is noteworthy, as Germany offers an excellent alternative to the US for such high-potential students.  International student enrollment in Germany has grown by 43% in the past four years, now comprising about 13% of Germany’s total higher education. 

The increasing availability of world-class online degrees – particularly at the Master’s level – is yet another option for many international students who face visa challenges and constantly changing rules in host countries. 

The evolution of higher education from an exclusive privilege to a mass-access system has redefined universities as market-driven enterprises.  The universities and the national systems that respond well to students as consumers – demanding career ROI, value, flexibility (anytime, anywhere), career-aligned curriculum, and respect as full fee-paying customers – are thriving in the global marketplace.

While democratic countries tend to think in election cycles and impose such restrictions, international students are beginning to vote with their decades-long careers in mind.  The marketplace will adjust to changing realities.  International students, by and large, will pursue their higher education dreams and find alternatives.  At the end, the ultimate winners will be systems and nations that welcome the best and the brightest students to their campuses and the losers will be those who create hurdle after hurdle to such students. 

When we observe the changes in the university hierarchies globally – using well-established metrics such as international accreditation/benchmarking, graduate employment, research publications and patents, ranking, and student demand/acceptance ratios, and the like, it is clear that the great higher education divide between the USA and the rest of the world is narrowing rapidly. 

Of course, global growth in educational levels and opportunities is a good thing for the world as a whole. Additionally, increased competition among institutions – especially the top institutions –should lead to even better teaching and research outcomes. The best American institutions should still prosper in this environment, but the US as a whole may lose its gold standard brand.

There is, however, a larger implication of these changes for the United States. Holding aside consideration of college and university enrollments and finances, having fewer top international students means fewer US students and institutions will benefit from the value of interacting with people from other countries. The importance of peer education has long been understood, but the value of that education is eroded if students are of uniform nationality. American citizens generally have had less exposure to the world than citizens of other, more outward looking nations. Fewer than half of Americans have passports and many have only used them rarely. And while many American colleges and institutions encourage study abroad and related programs, the majority of American students graduate without such experiences. The presence of international students on campuses helps to offset these limitations.

In 1990, the late Harvard political science professor Joseph S. Nye, Jr. coined the term “soft power” to describe a form of national power not based on coercion or payment, but instead on attraction. In simple terms, he contrasted coercive power (sticks) and payment power (carrots) with the power to attract (honey). In Nye’s conception, soft power is the capacity to influence others through culture, values and persuasion. American presidents of both parties as far back as Truman believed in the power of American values, ideals and culture as a “force for good in the world.” These beliefs were part of a shared vision of American leadership and responsibility.

Higher education was always seen as central to the development of soft power. Students came to the US from all over the world to gain their education. While some stayed in the US, most returned to their home nations with a more realistic understanding of American society and values. This was not a starry-eyed perspective of America as “ a City on the Hill,” a beacon to the world. Rather, it was more basic: an understanding and appreciation for the good and the bad of America. These people were part of a much broader awareness of the more intangible sources of power that come from a sense of national cohesion, a culture with universalistic foundations and an appreciation for international institutions. These people were, by and large, America’s friends. And all who studied in this way were able to see and deal with the United States in reasonable and rational ways.

In the words of Timthy Frye, soft power has not been” holstered” by an America First world view, but has been “dismantled.” This crisis for soft power is a broad American crisis. While its immediate effects are felt disproportionately by higher education, the true costs in reduced understanding and fewer partnerships will affect everyone. America is relinquishing a longstanding, vital international role.

Joseph Nye’s seminal work is Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, New York, Basic Books, 1990. See also: Joseph S. Nye, Jr. The Powers to Lead, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008 and Is the American Century Over? Cambridge (UK) Polity Press, 2015. Professor Nye died in 2025.

Timothy Frye’s quote is taken from his article Reflections on Soft Power, Columbia University,  Harriman Magazine of the Harriman Institute, 2026

Dr. Chet Haskell serves as Co-Head for the College Partnerships and Alliances for the Edu Alliance Group. Chet is a higher education leader with extensive experience in academic administration, institutional strategy, and governance. He recently completed six and a half years as Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs and University Provost at Antioch University, where he played a central role in creating the Coalition for the Common Good with Otterbein University. Earlier in his career, he spent 13 years at Harvard University in senior academic positions, including Executive Director of the Center for International Affairs and Associate Dean of the Kennedy School of Government.

He later served as Dean of the College at Simmons College and as President of both the Monterey Institute of International Studies and Cogswell Polytechnical College, successfully guiding both institutions through mergers. An experienced consultant, Dr. Haskell has advised universities and ministries of education in the United States, Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East on issues of finance, strategy, and accreditation. His teaching and research have focused on leadership and nonprofit governance, with a particular emphasis on helping smaller institutions adapt to financial and structural challenges. He earned DPA and MPA degrees from the University of Southern California, an MA from the University of Virginia, and an AB cum laude from Harvard University.

Dr. Senthil Nathan is the Co-Founder of Edu Alliance and a senior higher education leader with over 30 years of experience in the UAE and the broader Middle East. He has successfully directed more than 50 Edu Alliance projects for over 20 universities in the region, including Khalifa University (KU), Zayed University (ZU), United Arab Emirates University (UAEU), Higher Colleges of Technology (HCT), and NYU Abu Dhabi (NYUAD).
‍
Senthil played a pivotal role in the establishment and growth of HCT, the UAE’s second university, where he served for 24 years in academic and leadership roles—faculty, Chair, Dean, and College Director—before becoming Deputy Vice Chancellor of Planning and Administration for 8 years. In this capacity, he led strategic planning, budgeting, operations, HR, and workforce development across 17 campuses. As Dean of Engineering and Health Sciences, he pioneered more than 35 industry-sponsored programs and spearheaded commercial initiatives as Chief Planning Officer for CERT Technology Park.

He earned his Ph.D., Civil Engineering – Rice University, Houston, Texas, USA his M.S., Civil Engineering – Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, India and B.E. (Honors), Engineering – National Institute of Technology, Trichy, India.

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Tuition Reset

A Solution for Few, a Mirage for Many

June 1, 2026 by Dean Hoke – Seven private colleges have announced major tuition resets in the past eighteen months, cutting their published prices by as much as 60 percent. The announcements have generated headlines, praise from some observers, and renewed debate across higher education.

At first glance, the trend appears significant. When institutions slash tuition from $50,000 to $25,000 or from $40,000 to $20,000, it naturally attracts the attention of presidents, trustees, and enrollment leaders seeking ways to respond to mounting demographic and financial pressures.

But as I began looking more closely at the recent wave of tuition resets, a different question emerged. The issue is not whether tuition resets generate publicity. They clearly do. The more important question is whether the institutions making these dramatic pricing changes will be stronger five or ten years from now. The answer is more complicated than either advocates or critics typically acknowledge.

On April 17, 2026, Naropa University in Boulder, Colorado, became the seventh private nonprofit college in eighteen months to announce a major reduction in published tuition. The liberal arts institution introduced a simplified per-credit pricing structure for incoming students, froze tuition for continuing students, expanded Credit for Prior Learning opportunities, and wrapped the initiative within a broader strategic framework known as the Ponderosa Plan. Like many institutions announcing resets, Naropa framed the move as a departure from what it called the “business as usual” model of higher education.

Naropa joins a growing list. Hartwick College in New York reduced tuition from roughly $56,000 to $22,000. Bethel University in Minnesota dropped from $44,050 to $25,990. During a particularly active stretch in late 2025, Whitworth University, Emory & Henry University, Prescott College, and Averett University all announced reductions ranging from 37 to 56 percent.

Seven institutions in eighteen months certainly feels like a movement. Yet the broader data suggest otherwise. According to the 2024 NACUBO Tuition Discounting Study, released in June 2025, only 2.7 percent of surveyed private nonprofit institutions reported plans to implement a tuition reset. That percentage is smaller than the share planning to eliminate application fees.[1] Research conducted by Laura Lapovsky [9], along with the peer-reviewed work of James Dean Ward and Daniel Corral, reaches a similar conclusion. For most of the past decade, only four to six private nonprofit institutions reset tuition in a typical year.[2,3] In other words, tuition resets remain an exception, not a trend. What we are seeing today is not a sector-wide transformation. It is a concentrated cluster of institutions making a very specific strategic choice.

That distinction matters because tuition resets occupy a curious place in higher education. They generate enormous attention, yet relatively few colleges adopt them. They are often presented as bold solutions, yet many presidents privately express skepticism. And while advocates point to a handful of success stories, critics often point to an equally compelling list of disappointments.

To better understand what actually happens after a reset, I examined 38 private nonprofit institutions that implemented tuition resets between 2014-15 and 2019-20 using IPEDS undergraduate enrollment and finance data. The results were sobering.

The strategy can work. But the evidence suggests the conditions for success are far narrower than many institutions assume. More importantly, the typical outcome is not dramatic financial recovery. The typical outcome is an institution operating at roughly three-quarters of its inflation-adjusted pre-reset revenue a decade later.

Why Tuition Resets Continue to Appeal to Colleges

To understand why tuition resets continue to surface, it helps to understand the problem they are attempting to solve.

Published tuition at private nonprofit colleges has continued to climb for decades. Average tuition reached approximately $45,000 for the 2025-26 academic year. At the same time, the average net price paid by students has remained relatively stable and, in inflation-adjusted terms, has often declined.[4] The gap between those two numbers is institutional aid.

According to NACUBO, the average undergraduate tuition discount rate at private nonprofit colleges increased from 43 percent in 2015-16 to a projected 57.1 percent in 2025-26. [1] Put differently, institutions are now giving back more than half of their published tuition revenue through scholarships and grants. At some colleges, the number is even higher. Before its reset, Hartwick College’s discount rate approached 70 percent. The challenge is that most families never get far enough into the admissions process to understand any of this.

A 2022 Sallie Mae study found that 81 percent of students eliminated colleges from consideration based solely on published price before exploring financial aid options.[5] Ruffalo Noel Levitz reported similar findings among parents, with 67 percent saying they ruled out institutions based on sticker price alone.[6] Those numbers help explain why tuition resets remain attractive.

Many presidents and boards believe families are making decisions based on a number that few students pay. If that assumption is correct, lowering the sticker price becomes an attempt to remove a barrier before families disengage from the process.

Over the past several years, through conversations with presidents and enrollment leaders on Small College America, I’ve heard repeated frustration with the complexity of college pricing. Many leaders acknowledge that families often misunderstand what they will pay, yet few institutions have found a convincing alternative to the high-tuition, high-discount model. Viewed through that lens, the appeal of a tuition reset is understandable.

Yet there is another side to the equation. If the high-tuition, high-discount model is so problematic, why has it survived for so long?

Economist William Bogart offers several explanations in One Semester Away from a Crisis. First, institutional aid allows colleges to engage in price discrimination, charging different net prices to different students while maintaining a single published tuition rate. Second, higher prices can serve as a signal of quality, what Bogart calls the “Chivas Regal effect.” Third, families often respond more positively to receiving a substantial scholarship than to seeing a lower sticker price, even when the final cost is identical.

Whether one agrees with those dynamics or not, they help explain why the traditional pricing model has proven remarkably durable.

A tuition reset abandons many of those advantages at once. Colleges that cut tuition must replace what they lose through stronger enrollment, greater public trust, or ideally both. In an increasingly competitive enrollment environment, that is no small challenge.

What the Data Actually Show

When I began reviewing the outcomes of institutions that implemented tuition resets between 2014-15 and 2019-20, one finding stood out almost immediately.

Most institutions did not return to their pre-reset financial position. Among the 38 private nonprofit institutions examined, only seven had inflation-adjusted net tuition revenue at or above their pre-reset baseline in the most recent available year.[7] The median institution was operating at approximately 76 cents on the inflation-adjusted dollar.

Some outcomes were considerably worse. Lincoln Christian University in Illinois saw net tuition revenue fall from $7.1 million to $1.5 million over nine years as undergraduate enrollment declined from 573 students to 87. The institution ultimately closed in 2024.[7]

At first glance, these findings may appear to conflict with Ward and Corral’s 2023 study, which found that many institutions maintained relatively stable nominal tuition revenue after resets.[2] In reality, the findings complement one another.

Ward and Corral demonstrated that colleges often reduced institutional discounting sufficiently to preserve nominal revenue levels. My analysis suggests that once inflation is considered, many institutions nevertheless lost significant purchasing power over time. Holding revenue flat for a decade may look acceptable on paper. In practice, it means a college has fewer real dollars available to support operations, salaries, facilities, and student services.

Perhaps the most important finding, however, involved enrollment. The institutions that sustained or increased revenue after a reset generally shared one characteristic: they grew undergraduate enrollment. The strongest predictor of success was not the size of the tuition reduction. It was not the precision of the discount-rate strategy. It was not the marketing campaign. It was enrollment growth.

Looking more closely at those institutions revealed another important lesson. The schools that succeeded rarely relied on a lower sticker price alone. Some expanded online programs. Others built adult-degree pathways. Still others benefited from a strong institutional identity that continued attracting students even as many competitors struggled. In nearly every case, the tuition reset was part of a broader enrollment strategy rather than a standalone pricing decision.

The Strada Reframe: Trust, Not Just Price

Just as I was finishing the analysis for this article, a new piece of research arrived that helped explain why tuition resets continue to attract attention despite their mixed track record.

Released on May 5, 2026, a major survey from the Strada Education Foundation examined how students, parents, and other stakeholders experience college pricing. The study, co-authored by Kathryn J. Blanchard and James Dean Ward, drew responses from more than 5,000 individuals across six population groups and provides one of the clearest snapshots yet of how families think about college affordability.[8]

What makes the report particularly interesting is that Ward is also the lead author of the 2023 Research in Higher Education study examining tuition reset outcomes. In other words, the same researcher who helped document what happens financially after a tuition reset is also helping explain why families respond to pricing the way they do.

The Strada findings both validate and challenge the arguments made by tuition-reset advocates. On one hand, the report confirms something enrollment leaders have suspected for years: sticker price matters – a lot!

The percentage of parents who identified a postsecondary degree program as their student’s preferred pathway after high school fell from 74 percent in 2019 to 58 percent in 2025. Families are increasingly questioning both affordability and value. But the most important finding in the report has less to do with price and more to do with trust.

When students and parents were asked about their experience with the financial aid process, 68 percent described it as either confusing or mixed. Only about one-third found it straightforward. Even more striking, respondents who found the process most confusing were significantly more likely to believe colleges cared more about generating revenue than educating students. Among those who described the process as very confusing, 76 percent held that view. Among those who found it straightforward, the number dropped to 49 percent. The implication is difficult to ignore. Families are not simply reacting to cost. They are reacting to complexity, uncertainty, and a lack of confidence in what colleges are telling them.

The survey reinforced that conclusion when respondents were asked which affordability initiatives they preferred. Cost transparency ranked first, selected by 68 percent of respondents. Four-year price guarantees and financial-aid guarantees followed close behind. By contrast, net-price calculators and return-on-investment tools, two of the strategies colleges have invested heavily in over the past decade, ranked near the bottom.[8]

What families appear to want most is not necessarily a lower price; they want a price they can understand and trust. That distinction may be one of the most important lessons in the entire tuition-reset conversation. A college can cut its sticker price dramatically, but if the financial aid process remains complicated, inconsistent, or difficult to understand, the institution may have treated the symptom rather than the underlying problem. By contrast, a tuition reset paired with a published scholarship grid, a simplified aid letter, a four-year tuition guarantee, and a clear commitment to affordability begins to address the trust issue families say they care about most.

Reading the Current Wave

Viewed through that lens, the seven institutions that have announced tuition resets over the past eighteen months present a fascinating mix of opportunities and risks. Some appear to be aligning their pricing changes with broader strategic initiatives. Others seem to be placing much more weight on the reset itself.

Among the current group, Whitworth University, Bethel University, and Naropa University appear most closely aligned with the conditions that historical evidence suggests improving the likelihood of success.

Whitworth’s announcement included something many colleges talk about but relatively few provide: a transparent, published scholarship scale tied directly to student achievement. Families can estimate costs before ever speaking with an admissions counselor. That is a meaningful step toward transparency.

Bethel’s 41 percent reduction falls within what appears to be a psychologically meaningful pricing range. Perhaps more importantly, the university openly acknowledged that 98 percent of its students were already receiving aid. The reset was presented less as a discount and more as an effort to make pricing understandable.

Naropa’s approach may be the most comprehensive of the group. Rather than treating the tuition reduction as a standalone initiative, the university embedded it within a broader institutional strategy that includes expanded Credit for Prior Learning opportunities and the larger Ponderosa Plan.

On the other end of the spectrum are institutions facing considerably steeper challenges. Emory & Henry University has been operating under accreditor probation through June 2026 while addressing a significant budget deficit. Its own communications acknowledge that enrollment growth would strengthen institutional finances. That framing is important because it mirrors a pattern seen repeatedly in the historical data. Tuition resets launched from a position of distress rarely perform as hoped.

The institutions that achieved the strongest long-term outcomes generally reset from relative strength. Those pursuing resets as financial rescue strategies often discovered that pricing changes alone could not solve deeper structural problems.

Prescott College presents a different challenge. At a published tuition of $15,000 following a 56 percent reduction, the institution has established one of the most aggressive resets in recent memory. While that pricing point may attract attention, it also creates an extraordinarily demanding enrollment-growth requirement. Hartwick College remains the most interesting institution to watch because it is the only member of the current wave with a full year of post-reset experience.

Early indicators suggest positive enrollment momentum. At the same time, Hartwick’s published tuition for 2026-27 increased to $23,500, approximately 6.8 percent above its reset price. Whether that represents renewed pricing power or the beginning of a gradual return toward the traditional discounting model remains to be seen. The next several years should provide important clues.

Five Conditions That Separate Success from Failure

After reviewing the historical cases, analyzing the IPEDS data, examining the Strada findings, and studying both successful and unsuccessful resets, five themes emerged repeatedly. None guarantees success. Together, however, they appear in nearly every institution that achieved favorable long-term outcomes.

1. Financial Strength Before the Reset

Successful institutions generally entered the process with enough financial stability to absorb several years of revenue pressure while enrollment adjusted. Institutions already facing significant structural deficits often found that a tuition reset accelerated rather than solved their challenges.

2. A Price Point That Matters to Families

The size of the reduction matters less than where the final price lands. The evidence suggests that many successful resets moved institutions into a range that families viewed as meaningfully different from competitors. For many colleges, that threshold appears to fall somewhere between $20,000 and $27,000. The goal should not be creating the biggest headline but rather reaching a price point that changes family behavior.

3. Transparency, Not Just Affordability

The Strada findings point strongly in one direction: families want clarity. The most effective resets are likely to be those paired with transparent scholarship policies, simplified aid communications, and predictable pricing over multiple years. Whitworth’s published scholarship grid offers one example of what that can look like in practice.

4. A Clear Enrollment-Growth Strategy

Successful institutions did not rely on lower tuition alone. The University of Charleston expanded programs and campuses. Wilson expanded online and adult education. The University of the Cumberlands dramatically increased online enrollment. Southern Virginia and Ave Maria leveraged strong institutional identities. Each institution had a plan for where additional students would come from. Without that plan, a reset often generates a short-term surge in applications before enrollment growth levels off.

5. Leadership Stability

Finally, successful resets require leadership willing to stay long enough to see the strategy through. Concordia-St. Paul, University of Charleston, and Colby-Sawyer all benefited from leaders with deep institutional credibility and long tenures. A tuition reset is not a one-year initiative it is a multi-year institutional commitment.

The Bottom Line

After reviewing the evidence, I believe tuition resets are neither miracle cures nor misguided gimmicks; they are strategic tools. Like any tool, they can be used effectively or poorly.

The historical record suggests that tuition resets can succeed when they are implemented from a position of relative strength, supported by a broader enrollment-growth strategy, reinforced by transparency reforms, and sustained by stable leadership. The University of Charleston demonstrates that such outcomes are possible, but those cases are the exception rather than the rule.

Across the 38 institutions examined in this analysis, roughly 82 percent failed to recover their inflation-adjusted pre-reset revenue. Most experienced an initial boost in applications and some degree of enrollment stabilization. Few achieved sustained financial transformation.

What the Strada research contributes is a fresh way of thinking about the problem. Perhaps the issue was never simply price. Instead, the challenge may stem from decades of increasing complexity, escalating discount rates, confusing financial aid packages, and a growing lack of public trust in how colleges communicate cost.

Viewed through that lens, a tuition reset is not a cure-all but one of several possible strategies for rebuilding confidence with students and families. Other institutions may pursue different approaches, such as guaranteeing tuition for four years, creating more transparent scholarship structures, or simplifying financial aid communications. The common thread is not the specific tactic chosen, but the effort to make college pricing more understandable and predictable.

The evidence reviewed in this article points toward a cautious but encouraging conclusion. Even institutions that did not fully recover lost revenue often experienced increases in Pell-eligible enrollment, suggesting that tuition resets can improve access for some student populations. For colleges committed to expanding opportunity, that outcome deserves careful consideration.

At the same time, these results raise an important governance question. Before approving a tuition reset, boards and senior leaders should establish clear expectations about what success will look like. If the primary objective is immediate revenue recovery, historical results suggest caution. If the goal is to maintain long-term financial sustainability while improving transparency, strengthening trust, and broadening access, the record appears more favorable.

Ultimately, a tuition reset should be viewed not as a standalone pricing decision but as part of a broader institutional strategy. Every board considering such a move should ask several fundamental questions: Can the institution withstand several years of financial pressure? Has it identified a price point that will genuinely influence family behavior? Is it prepared to simplify and improve its communication about cost and financial aid? Does it have a realistic plan to generate enrollment growth? And will leadership remain in place long enough to see the strategy through?

If the answer to any of those questions is no, a tuition reset may do little to address the underlying challenges facing the institution. If the answers are yes, however, a reset can become part of a larger effort to align pricing, mission, and student access. As the seven institutions currently undertaking tuition resets report results over the next several years, higher education will gain valuable new evidence about what works, for whom, and under what circumstances.

References

[1] National Association of College and University Business Officers. (2025). 2024 NACUBO Tuition Discounting Study. Washington, DC: NACUBO. Released June 2025. [Covers 2024–25 academic year data from 286 private nonprofit institutions; reports 56.3% first-time full-time undergraduate discount rate and 51.4% all-undergraduate rate.]

[2] Ward, J. D., & Corral, D. (2023). Do tuition resets work? Examining enrollment and net tuition revenue outcomes. Research in Higher Education, 64(6).

[3] Corral, D., & Ward, J. D. (2024). Tuition resets and Pell-eligible enrollment: Access outcomes following institutional price reductions. The Review of Higher Education, 47(2).

[4] College Board. (2025). Trends in College Pricing 2025. New York: College Board. [Source for average published tuition of $45,000 at private nonprofit four-year institutions in 2025–26 and inflation-adjusted net price trends.]

[5] Sallie Mae & Ipsos. (2022). How America Pays for College 2022. Newark, DE: Sallie Mae Bank. [ERIC ED624387. Source for the 81 percent of students who eliminated colleges based on sticker price.]

[6] Ruffalo Noel Levitz, Ardeo, & CampusESP. (2024). 2024 Prospective Family Engagement Report. Cedar Rapids, IA: RNL. [Source for 67 percent of parents ruling out colleges based on sticker price alone, based on a survey of more than 11,000 parents of prospective college students.]

[7] Author’s analysis. Undergraduate enrollment from IPEDS Fall Enrollment survey (EFA Level 2, full-time and part-time undergraduates), academic years 2014–15 through 2022–23. Net tuition revenue from IPEDS Finance survey, F2 form (F2D01), same period. All revenue figures are adjusted for inflation using the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI-U. Channel-mix evidence drawn from individual institution IPEDS distance-education data and institutional reporting. The dataset covers 38 private nonprofit institutions that executed tuition resets between 2014–15 and 2019–20.

[8] Blanchard, K. J., & Ward, J. D. (2026). The Price Transparency Imperative: Rebuilding Confidence in Higher Education. Indianapolis: Strada Education Foundation. Released May 5, 2026. https://www.strada.org/reports/the-price-transparency-imperative-rebuilding-confidence-in-higher-education

[9] Lapovsky, L. (2019). Do price resets work? Council of Independent Colleges. Washington, DC: CIC.

Dean Hoke is the Executive Producer and co-host for the podcast series  Small College America and Managing Partner of Edu Alliance Group, a higher education consultancy firm based in Bloomington, Indiana, and Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates. He formerly served as President/CEO of the American Association of University Administrators (AAUA). Dean has worked with higher education institutions worldwide. With decades of experience in higher education leadership, consulting, and institutional strategy, he brings a wealth of knowledge on colleges’ challenges and opportunities.  

Dean also serves as a Senior Fellow at the Sagamore Institute based in Indianapolis, Indiana,  where he is currently researching the Economic and Social Impact of Small Colleges in Rural Communities.