The Inevitable Question: How Can Small Colleges Survive in an Era of Consolidation?

January 5, 2026Editor’s Note: Last week we published a synthesis of insights from Small College America’s 2025 webinar series, featuring voices from seven leaders navigating change, partnerships, and strategic decisions. Here, two expert panelists from the December webinar on mergers and partnerships provide a deeper analytical examination of the economic forces and partnership models reshaping small colleges.

By Dr. Chet Haskell and Dr. Barry Ryan. During a recent national webinar titled Navigating Higher Education’s Existential Challenges: From Partnerships and Mergers to Reinvention, in which we served as panelists, we were struck by both the familiarity and the seriousness of the questions raised by senior higher education leaders—particularly those concerning the growing consideration of mergers and partnerships. Most were no longer asking whether change is coming, but which options remain realistically available.

This article builds on conversations from that webinar and complements the recent synthesis of insights shared by our fellow panelists and the college presidents who participated in Small College America’s fall webinar series. Here we examine more systematically the economic forces and partnership models small colleges must now navigate. This article represents our attempt to step back from that conversation and examine more deliberately the forces now reshaping higher education.

Anyone involved with higher education is both aware and concerned about the struggles of small, independent colleges and the challenges to their viability. Defined as having 3000 or fewer students, more than 90% of these institutions lack substantial endowments and other financial assets and thus are at risk.

For many of these institutions, the risk is truly existential. Many simply are too small, too under-financed, too strapped to have any reasonable path to continuity. The result is the almost weekly announcement of a closure with all the pain and loss that accompanies such events.

Why is all this happening? Most of the problems are well known and openly discussed. Since almost all of these institutions are tuition revenue dependent, the biggest threat is declining enrollments. Demographic changes leading to fewer high school graduates are central, a situation exacerbated in many cases by Federal policy changes that discourage international students. But there are many others: excessive tuition discounting leading to reduced net tuition revenue, rising operating costs for everything from facilities to insurance to employee salaries, changes in state and Federal policies, especially student aid policies and restrictions on international students are just some examples.

The reality is that higher education is in a period of consolidation. After decades of growth beginning after the Second World War, the basic economic drivers of the private, non-profit residential undergraduate institutions are slowing down or even reversing. There simply are not enough traditional students to make all institutions viable. The basic financial model no longer works. If it did work, one could expect to see new institutions springing up. This has not happened except in the for-profit sphere, a totally different model known mostly for its excesses and failures. While there is a place for the for-profit approach, it is not in the small liberal arts college world. This is true for the same reason that the small institutions are under stress: the economics do not work.

One crucial challenge is simple scale or, rather, lack thereof. Small institutions have fewer opportunities for achieving economies of scale. Unlike larger public institutions (that have different challenges of their own) these colleges cannot have large classes as a significant characteristic of their modes of delivery. Their basic model assumes a relatively comprehensive curriculum provided through small classes, giving a wide variety of choices and pathways to a degree for undergraduates. But the broader the curriculum, the fewer students per program, almost always without commensurate faculty reductions. The economic inefficiency of the current model is clear.

And there are certain base personnel costs beyond the faculty. Every institution needs a range of administrative personnel (often required by accreditors) regardless of size. Attracting experienced personnel to such institutions is neither easy nor inexpensive.

The undergraduate residential model is both a key element in the American higher education ecosystem and a beloved concept for those fortunate enough to have experienced it. These schools are often cornerstones of small communities. They have produced an inordinate number of future professors and scholars. For example, a 2022 NCSES study provided evidence of doctoral degree attainment being at higher ratios for graduates of baccalaureate arts and science institutions than for baccalaureate graduates of R1 research universities.* The basic matter of scale is central to the liberal arts institutions’ attractiveness for students who may go on to doctoral study: small classes with high levels of faculty interaction; a focus on teaching instead of research; the sense of intimacy and a clear mission.

With proper planning and courage, some of these colleges may yet find ways to survive through some form of merger with – or acquisition by – a larger and stronger institution. Further, with sufficient foresight, many other seemingly more solid colleges may find ways to assure survival through other forms of partnerships.

However, the fact is that only the wealthiest 10% of institutions are not at immediate risk, even though prudence would suggest even they should be considering possible changes in their paths.

What can be done?

There have been multiple efforts to reimagine higher education. Some have been based on technology and have led to the growth of various distance or remote models, some quite successful, other less so. MOOCs were going to take over education generally, but have faded. For-profit models have all too often led to abuses, especially of poorer students. Artificial intelligence is at the forefront of current change concepts, but it is too early to assess outcomes. But small residential colleges have resisted such innovations, in part because they are clear about their education model and in part because they often lack the expertise or the resources to take advantage of change.

Some institutions have sought to mitigate the impacts of their scale limitations through consortia arrangements with other institutions. While significant savings may be achieved through the sharing of administrative costs, such as information technology systems or certain other “back office” functions, these savings are unlikely to be more than marginal in impact.

Other impacts for a consortium may come from cost sharing on the academic side. Small academic departments (foreign languages, for example) may permit modest faculty reductions while providing a wider range of choices for students. Athletic facilities and even teams may be shared, as well as some academic services such as international offices or career services operations. In the case of two of the most successful consortia, the Claremont Colleges and the Atlanta University Center, the schools share a central library. Access to electronic databases certainly creates an easier and less expensive pathway to increased economically efficient use of critical resources.

While the savings in expenses may be considered marginal, the true potential in such arrangements is the chance to grow collective student enrollments by offering more options and amenities than would be possible for a single institution.

However, there are other challenges to the consortium model. A primary one relates to location. Institutions near each other likely can find more ways to take advantage of the contiguity than those widely separated. Examples might be the Five Colleges in Western Massachusetts, the previously noted Claremont Colleges or the Atlanta University Center that links four HBCU institutions in the same city. New examples of cooperation include the recently announce CaliBaja Higher Education Consortium, a joint effort of both private and public institutions reaching across the border in the San Diego/Baja California region.

A different kind of sharing arrangement is represented by initiatives to share academic programs though arrangements where one institution provides courses and programs to others through licensing agreements and the like. An example would be Rize Education, an initiative that seeks to enable undergraduate institutions to expand and enhance academic offerings through courses designed elsewhere that can be readily integrated into existing curricula, thus avoiding the costs of time and money needed to build new programs.

At the other end of the spectrum are straightforward mergers and acquisitions. One institution takes over another. Sometimes this is accomplished in ways that preserve at least parts of the acquired school, even if only for political reasons related to alumni, but the reality is that one institution swallows another.

Another version is a true merger of rough equals. There are numerous examples, one of the best known being Case Western Reserve University in Ohio. In this situation, two separate institutions decided they could both be better together and, over time, they have built an integrated university of quality. A recent example may be the announced merger of Willamette University and Pacific University in Oregon. Such arrangements are quite complex, but may provide a model for certain institutions.

A third model might be the new Coalition for the Common Good. Initially a partnership of two independent universities, Antioch and Otterbein Universities, the Coalition is built on three principles: symbiosis, multilateralism and mission. The symbiosis involves Antioch taking on and expanding Otterbein’s graduate programs for the shared benefit of both institutions. Multilateralism refers to the Coalition basic concept of being more than two institutions as the goal: a collection of similar institutions. Mission is central to the Coalition. The initial partners share long histories of institutional culture and mission, as reflected in the name of the Coalition itself.

Other partnership models are possible and should be encouraged. While it is rare to see a partnership of true equals, as one partner is usually dominant, this middle ground between a complete merger or acquisition and consortia should be fertile ground for innovation for forward thinking institutions not in dire straits. Since there is no single approach to such structures, the benefits to participating partners should be at the core of the approach. These partnerships may be able to address the challenge of scale and provide opportunities for shared costs. Properly presented, they should be attractive to potential students and provide a competitive edge in a highly competitive environment.

The importance of mission and culture

While the root cause of most college declines and failures is economic in nature, it is all too easy to forget the role of an institution’s mission and culture. Many colleges look alike in terms of academic offerings, yet institutions usually have a carefully defined and defended mission or purpose. These missions are important because they help define the college as more than just a collection of courses. Education can serve many different missions and thus mission clarity is crucial to institutional identify. And identity is one way for institutions to differentiate themselves from competition, while also helping to attract students.

Mission is also tied to institutional culture. Colleges have different subjective cultures that serve to attract certain students, as well as faculty and staff members. Spending four years of one’s life ought not to be spent in an impersonal organizational setting. There are multiple individual personal reasons for attending one institution instead of another. Most of these reasons are not entirely objective, but instead depend on an individual’s sense of ‘fit’ in the college setting.

What should institutions be doing?

The stark reality is that for many smaller institutions the alternative to some sort of partnership is likely to be closure. But closure is not to be taken lightly. The impact of these institutions is far-reaching and the human, educational and community costs are very real.

All institutions, regardless of financial assets, should be openly discussing their futures in a changing world. As noted, a few may be able to simply proceed with what they have been doing for years. But this luxury (or blindness) is not a viable or attractive option for most.

Every institution should be looking into the future at its basic model. Is there a realistic path to assuring enrollment and revenue growth in excess of expenses over time? Is there a budget model that provides regular surpluses that can provide a cushion against unanticipated challenges or can enable investment in new initiatives? Are there alternative paths to revenues that can augment tuition, such as fundraising, auxiliary enterprises or the like? And in looking at such questions, an institution should be asking how it can be better off over time with a partner or partners.

Even institutions that examine such matters and conclude it would be advantageous to engage a partner are faced with daunting challenges. First is determining what is desired in a partner and then identifying one. Some colleges feel bound by geography, so can only think about like institutions nearby. Others are more creative, looking to use technology to enable a more widely dispersed partnership.

Once a partner is identified, the path to an agreement is arduous, complex, lengthy and costly. Accreditors, the Department of Education, state boards of higher education, alumni, and all manner of other interested parties must be addressed. This requires external legal and financial expertise. This process is excessively demanding of an institution’s leaders, especially presidents, provosts and chief financial officers. Boards must be deeply involved and internal constituencies of faculty and staff must be brought along.

And once a final agreement is reached, signed and approved, the work has only begun. The implementation of any partnership is also arduous, complex, lengthy and costly. Furthermore, implementation involves deep human factors, as institutional cultures must be aligned and new personal professional partnerships must be developed.

The fact is that many institutions will either enter into some form of partnerships in the coming years, as the alternative will be closure. Unfortunately, the clock is ticking, and unnecessary delays create limitations on available options and increase risks. Every institution’s path into partnerships will vary, as will the particulars of each arrangement. It is incumbent upon boards of trustees and institutional leaders to face such facts realistically and to devise practical plans to move forward. Not doing so would be a dereliction of duty.


Dr. Chet Haskell is an experienced higher education consultant focusing on existential challenges to smaller nonprofit institutions. and opportunities for collaboration. Dr. Haskell is a former two-time president and, most recently, a provost directly involved in three significant merger acquisitions or partnership agreements. including the coalition. for the common good, the partnership of Antioch and Otterbein University.

Barry Ryan is an experienced leader and attorney. has served as a president and provost for multiple universities. He helped guide several institutions through mergers, acquisitions, and accreditation. Most recently, he led Woodbury University through its merger. with the University of Redlands. He also serves on university boards and is a commissioner for WASC.

Haskell and Ryan are the Co-Directors of the Center for College Partnerships and Alliances, launched by Edu Alliance Group in late 2025. It is dedicated to helping higher education institutions explore and implement college partnerships, mergers, and strategic alliances designed to strengthen sustainability and mission alignment.


From Silent Stakeholders to Strategic Partners: Donor Engagement in College Mergers

November 2, 2025, By Dean Hoke — When Sweet Briar College’s trustees voted to close in 2015, they framed the decision as a financial necessity. Alumnae mounted an extraordinary campaign—raising $28.5 million in 110 days—and, through a state-brokered settlement, the college reopened under new governance. By 2023, donors had contributed well over $133 million since the crisis. What looked like an inevitable failure became one of higher education’s most remarkable turnarounds.

Sweet Briar is not only a story of crisis response; it exposes a recurring miscalculation in today’s merger conversations: the assumption that boardroom consensus equals donor legitimacy. Trustees speak for donors in a fiduciary sense—they hold legal responsibility for institutional assets—but not in the communal sense that captures sentiment, legacy, and trust. When colleges announce merger talks, headlines dwell on enrollment curves and debt ratios. Yet behind every deal stands a quieter, decisive constituency: major donors, family foundations, and planned-giving benefactors whose confidence (or loss of it) can determine whether the combined institution thrives—or limps forward under the weight of broken relationships.

This article reframes mergers as philanthropic integration projects. The legal mechanics matter, but durable success is won in the design phase: early engagement with philanthropic stakeholders, explicit safeguards for identity and donor intent, transparent transition planning, and a mission-first case that invites continued—and new—investment. When leaders bring donors and alumni into the architecture of the merger rather than the press release, they convert anxiety into commitment and preserve the institutional DNA that constituents care about most.

We’ll see this principle in contrasting cases: mission-advancing acquisitions that attracted significant philanthropic support, integrations that prioritized identity and donor intent from the outset, and lessons from failed or contested processes. The throughline is simple: treat philanthropy as a core workstream—not an afterthought—and the odds of a credible, sustainable merger rise dramatically.

Why Donor Engagement Matters More Than Ever

The stakes have never been higher. Survey data from Ruffalo Noel Levitz’s 2025 National Alumni Survey, which surveyed more than 50,000 alumni, reveals that donor relationships with higher education are already strained. While 81% of alumni report that being philanthropic is important to them personally and 77% make charitable donations, their connection to their alma mater has weakened dramatically. Only 31% of alumni who donate to any charity gave to their alma mater last year, dropping to just 19% among Millennials and 10% among Gen Z graduates.

Even more troubling: 59% of alumni who never donate to their alma mater actively support other causes, as do 83% of lapsed donors. They have not stopped giving—they have simply redirected their philanthropy elsewhere. This suggests that alumni disengagement reflects institutional failure rather than generational selfishness.

Satisfaction drives everything. Alumni who report being ‘very satisfied’ with their student experience are 18 times more likely to donate than neutral respondents and 73 times more likely than dissatisfied graduates. Yet only 42% of Gen Z alumni report feeling ‘very satisfied’ with their experience, compared to 72% of Silent Generation graduates.

Mergers test already-fragile relationships. When institutions announce consolidation, donors who felt lukewarm about their undergraduate experience see confirmation that their alma mater is failing. A merger framed solely as a financial necessity will not inspire them. But a merger presented as advancing mission-driven impact—expanding access, strengthening programs that address social challenges, or preserving an educational model under threat—can mobilize support from the very alumni who have drifted away.

What History Already Taught Us (and We Often Forget)

As Millett (1976) noted, successful integrations often ‘show structure, not just sentiment’—for example, Case Western Reserve kept a distinct Case Institute identity, and Carnegie Mellon created a Carnegie Institute of Engineering and a Mellon Institute of Science to carry legacies forward.

A half-century ago, John D. Millett’s 1976 analysis of U.S. college mergers examined a range of cases—from research institutes to liberal arts colleges—and distilled lessons that remain strikingly current. Four observations deserve renewed attention today:

1. Endowments transfer; relationships do not. In many mergers, endowments and restricted funds move to successor institutions through standard legal pathways. The mechanics are manageable. The harder work is relational: ensuring donors can see how their original intent will be honored in the new configuration, and that the program or ethos they loved will not be erased.

2. Alumni skepticism is predictable—and manageable. Leaders should not assume alumni approval, especially when the smaller institution is absorbed. Visible steps to cultivate and retain legacy alumni—keeping familiar staff contacts for a transitional period, acknowledging a distinct identity, and offering tangible ways to shape the merged future—go a long way.

3. Governance approval is not donor legitimacy. Even when boards vote, state bodies concur, and presidents sign, philanthropic legitimacy remains a separate test. Communities expect to be consulted; they often oppose mergers if they learn about them too late. Participation must be planned early, not added later.

4. Language and structure matter more than sentiment. Labels and explanations—federation versus absorption, mission expansion versus rescue—shape how alumni and donors interpret the outcome. Leaders who explain clear educational benefits and who visibly protect identity through formal structures earn trust faster.

Historical Examples: Structure, Not Just Sentiment

After the Case Institute of Technology and Western Reserve University merger, the successor Case Western Reserve University continued the designation of Case Institute of Technology as an organizational component. At Carnegie Mellon University, leaders created a Carnegie Institute of Engineering and a Mellon Institute of Science—formal structures that carried legacy identities forward within the new entity.

The Bellarmine-Ursuline (Louisville) merger (1968-1971) offers another instructive example. The combined institution briefly used the Bellarmine-Ursuline name before reverting to Bellarmine College in 1971, but Bellarmine has continued to honor Ursuline identity through durable structures—explicitly including Ursuline alumnae in alumni awards and honors and recognizing the Ursuline legacy through commemorations and alumni programming. These are structural signals that preserve identity even when the combined name does not persist.

Millett also notes that successor institutions often made special effort to cultivate and retain alumni of the absorbed college, including keeping an alumni-relations officer from the legacy institution and providing a special alumni designation or status—practical ways to keep traditions and community intact during transition.

Three Models Leaders Use—and Which One Works

Crisis-Reactive: What Not to Do

Planning is done privately, the announcement is abrupt, and donors are asked to accept a fait accompli. Mills College’s merger with Northeastern University proceeded despite alumni resistance, prompting legal challenges over donor intent. The Alumnae Association spent hundreds of thousands in legal fees opposing the merger, and a class action lawsuit resulted in a $1.25 million settlement. The litigation divided alumnae and consumed resources that could have been invested in the merged institution’s success.

Even when the legal mechanics are sound, the community verdict is that identity has been erased. The result: backlash, donor-intent disputes, and years of costly trust repair.

Compliance-Only: Necessary but Insufficient

Teams carefully inventory restricted funds, ensure transfers align with donor intent, and communicate the basics. This prevents disasters but rarely generates enthusiasm or new investment. Survey data reveals that 70% of alumni need to believe their gift amount matters, and 66% rate the ability to see how their gift is used as critical. When a college merges, donors worry their legacy has been erased—regardless of legal assurances that funds will be protected.

The compliance model maintains existing donors but does not mobilize new support for the merged institution’s expanded mission. The message is ‘We will comply,’ not ‘Here is a better future you can help build.’

Strategic Partnership: The Target State

Donors and foundations are treated as co-creators from Day 0. Leaders conduct quiet briefings with major benefactors pre-announcement, frame the merger as mission expansion, and embed structural commitments to legacy preservation. This model doesn’t eliminate hard feelings, but it channels energy toward shared outcomes.

Delaware State University–Wesley College (2020–21). DSU—an HBCU—acquired Wesley and framed the move as mission advancement, launching the Wesley College of Health & Behavioral Sciences to expand pathways in nursing and allied health for underserved students. Financing combined philanthropy and prudence: a $20M unrestricted gift from MacKenzie Scott (with a portion—reported as roughly one-third of the $15M total—applied to transition costs) and a $1M Longwood Foundation grant for the acquisition. The case shows how a mission-first narrative can catalyze major-donor and foundation support.

By tying dollars to a new health‑workforce pipeline—rather than balance‑sheet triage—leaders converted donor anxiety into visible, restricted impact.

Ursuline College–Gannon University (ongoing). From the outset, both institutions engaged stakeholders publicly and affirmed philanthropy principles: “Honoring donor intent is important to Gannon University,” and donors will be able to designate gifts to the Pepper Pike campus. Ursuline will retain its identity as the Ursuline College Campus of Gannon University after the transition, and the Ursuline Sisters of Cleveland have voiced support for the merger—signals aimed at preserving community trust and legacy while the integration proceeds through 2026. These commitments, paired with the HLC’s Change-of-Control approval, frame the merger as continuity-minded rather than absorptive.

University of Tennessee Southern (formerly Martin Methodist College).

University of Tennessee Southern (formerly Martin Methodist College)
When Martin Methodist joined the University of Tennessee System in 2021, leaders prioritized transparent, compassionate communication—“a liminal space” requiring a strong plan, as President Mark La Branche put it. They also set aside portions of the legacy endowment (via the Martin Methodist College Foundation) to protect signature programs, showing that integration need not erase institutional identity.

Public commitments to donor intent and the campus naming convention did early legitimacy work that legal filings can’t.

Engaging the Acquiring Institution’s Donors

When a stronger institution absorbs a struggling one, leaders often assume donor concerns belong primarily to the acquired institution. This is a strategic error. The acquiring institution’s donors also have a stake in the outcome—and their continued support is essential to merger success.

Major donors to the acquiring institution may question why resources should be directed toward absorbing another college. They may worry that the acquired institution’s struggles will tarnish their alma mater’s reputation, or that merger costs will compete with planned campus improvements. These concerns are legitimate and require proactive engagement.

Frame the Merger as a Strategic Opportunity

The narrative for acquiring institution donors must emphasize strategic opportunity rather than charitable rescue. Several frames can be effective:

Geographic expansion: The merger creates a presence in a new market, expanding the institution’s reach and visibility.

Program complementarity: The acquired institution brings academic strengths that fill gaps in the acquiring institution’s portfolio.

Mission advancement: The merger expands capacity to serve students and fulfill the educational mission on a greater scale.

Competitive positioning: In an era of consolidation, the merger strengthens the institution’s competitive position and long-term sustainability.

Rather than waiting for resistance to emerge, acquiring institution leaders should brief major donors before public announcement. These confidential conversations acknowledge donors’ legitimate interest in institutional strategy, allow leaders to address concerns directly, and create opportunities for donors to become merger advocates.

Legal clarity: When restricted funds cannot be used as originally intended post‑merger, pursue a cy‑près modification early—advancement and counsel should partner on donor communication before any filing to preserve trust.

You can brief a small set of major donors pre‑announcement under strict NDAs without privileging them over faculty governance or regulators. Use a defined rubric for who is briefed (e.g., top 10% of lifetime commitments and active pledgors), disclose no nonpublic counterparties’ terms, and limit to mission rationale, identity safeguards, and timeline. Record each briefing in counsel’s log.

A Practical Playbook for Philanthropic Integration

Before Announcement (Day 0 Work)

Philanthropic due diligence—parallel to financial. Inventory endowed and restricted funds, bequests in the pipeline, and active foundation grants. Identify potential cy-près risks and draft stewardship language now. Treat this as a distinct workstream with advancement, finance, and counsel at the table from the start.

Quiet briefings with top donors and foundations on both sides. Under confidentiality, preview the rationale, surface donor-intent questions, and invite advice. Ask for early champions willing to speak publicly when the time comes.

Identity protections by design, not promise. Prepare a naming plan (e.g., ‘[Legacy] College at [Acquirer]’), preserve scholarship and reporting lines, and keep alumni-relations continuity for 12-24 months. Publish a short ‘Identity & Intent’ brief on day one that shows, in plain language, how donor purposes are carried forward.

At Announcement

Mission-driven case for support. Lead with the educational value only possible together: new academic pathways, access expansions, regional partnerships, research synergies. Avoid rescue framing. Make the case specific and concrete, tied to programs and outcomes donors care about.

Dedicated ‘Legacy to Impact’ funds with challenge matches. Create visible vehicles that convert anxiety into investment—restricted funds for scholarships, program launches, and student success tied to the integrated entity.

Community-benefit specificity. Spell out local benefits and stakeholder wins (clinics, teacher pipelines, innovation hubs). When people can ‘see’ the upside, they are likelier to invest in it.

First 12-24 Months

Quarterly transparency. Report enrollment in merged programs, first scholarship cohorts, renewed or new foundation grants, and capital milestones. Transparency reduces rumors and builds credibility.

Recognition symmetry. Offer parity for legacy and acquirer donors—naming walls, digital honor rolls, endowed-fund dashboards, and joint stewardship events.

Two-sided cultivation. Brief the acquirer’s major donors so they see strategic growth rather than a charitable drain. Ask two or three to seed a matching pool restricted to merger priorities; matches signal confidence and reduce perceived risk.

Measuring Success Beyond the Closing Date

Because reliable analytics on donor behavior in mergers are sparse, leaders should build their own lightweight evidence base. For each merger, track three years pre- and post-integration for: total private support; alumni participation (where available); number of $1M+ gifts; and the mix of restricted versus unrestricted giving.

Pair quantitative metrics with a qualitative log: Was identity preserved in naming? Did a Legacy Alumni structure exist? Were there donor-intent disputes? Did the acquirer launch dedicated legacy funds? How soon were KPIs reported?

Even a simple dashboard, updated quarterly, changes the conversation with trustees and donors. It shows momentum (or lack thereof), prompts targeted stewardship, and gives leaders permission to make mid-course corrections. It also validates the core claim of this article: philanthropy works best when it is built into planning, not bolted on after the fact.

Conclusion: From Stakeholders to Strategic Partners

The most fundamental error in merger planning is treating donors as communications targets rather than strategic partners. Donors are not merely sources of revenue to be managed; they are partners whose investments reflect belief in institutional mission and values.

Mergers that succeed treat donors, foundations, and alumni as planning inputs, not a downstream audience for PR. Millett’s 1976 study reminds us that while the legal mechanics of endowment transfers are straightforward, the human mechanics are not. Alumni skepticism is predictable; identity needs visible protection through formal structures, not just promises; language and framing carry unusual weight.

When leaders internalize those lessons—and create structures that honor donor intent, invite co-creation, and make the mission upside measurable—legacy becomes leverage rather than liability. Higher education’s financial pressures are real, but so is the reservoir of goodwill that donors and alumni hold for institutions that respect them.

The Sweet Briar alumnae who raised $133 million did not do so because they were told the college would comply with donor intent. They did so because they were invited to co-create a future worth investing in. That is the lesson for every merger: bring philanthropic stakeholders into the room early, build identity protections into the design, launch vehicles that convert anxiety into investment, and report steadily and transparently on what their support makes possible.

That is how two proud legacies become one stronger future—and how the ‘silent stakeholders’ find their voice in shaping it.

Sources (selected): institutional FAQs and press releases (Ursuline–Gannon; DSU–Wesley; UT Southern), RNL Alumni Giving Data 2025 (for participation/attitudes), and Millett, J.D. (1976) ED134105 on college mergers.

Dean Hoke is Managing Partner of Edu Alliance Group, a higher education consultancy. He formerly served as President/CEO of the American Association of University Administrators (AAUA). Dean has worked with higher education institutions worldwide. With decades of experience in higher education leadership, consulting, and institutional strategy, he brings a wealth of knowledge on colleges’ challenges and opportunities. Dean is the Executive Producer and co-host for the podcast series Small College America.