Is There a Collaborative Middle Ground Between Mergers and Consortia for the Sustainability of Small Independent Institutions?

July 28, 2025, by Dr. Chet Haskell: The headlines are full of uncertainty for American higher education. “Crisis” is a common descriptor. Federal investigations of major institutions are underway. Severe cuts to university research funding have been announced. The elimination of the Department of Education is moving ahead. Revisions to accreditation processes are being floated. Reductions in student support for educational grants and loans are now law. International students are being restricted.

These uncertainties and pressures affect all higher education, not just targeted elite institutions. In particular, they are likely to exacerbate the fragility of smaller, independent non-profit institutions already under enormous stress. Such institutions, some well-known, others known only locally, will be hard hit particularly hard by the combination of Trump Administration pressures and the developing national demographic decline for traditional-age students.(https://www.highereddive.com/news/decline-high-school-graduates-demographic-cliff-wiche-charts/738281/) These small colleges have been a key element of the American higher education scene, as well as for numerous local communities, for many decades.

It is widely understood that the vibrancy of American higher education comes, in part, from the diversity of its institutions and educational goals. The rich mixture of American colleges and universities is a strength that many other nations lack. Students have opportunities to start and stop their educations, to change directions and academic goals, to move among different types of institutions.

Smaller undergraduate colleges play important roles in this non-systemic system. They provide focused educational opportunities for younger adults, where they can build their lives on broad principles. Impressively large percentages of small college graduates go on to graduate education for various professions. Small colleges provide large numbers of graduates who enter PhD programs and eventually enter the professorate.

There are approximately 1179 accredited private institutions with enrollments of fewer than 3000 students. Of these, 185 have between 3000 and 2000 students. Another 329 have enrollments below 2000 but above 1000. A final 650 institutions have enrollments below 1000. These 1179 institutions students include few wealthy colleges such as Williams, Amherst, Carleton or Pomona, as well as numerous struggling, relatively unknowns.

A basic problem is one of scale. In the absence of significant endowments or other external support, it is very difficult to manage small institutions in a cost effective manner. Institutions with enrollments below 1000 are particularly challenged in this regard. The fundamental economics of small institutions are always challenging, as most are almost completely dependent on student enrollments, a situation getting worse with the coming decline of traditional college age students. There are limited options available to offset this decline. Renewed attention to student retention is one. Another is adding limited graduate programs. However, both take investment, appropriate faculty and staff capacity and time, all of which are often scarce.

These institutions have small endowments measured either in total or per student value. Of the 1179. There are only 80 with total endowments in excess of $200 million. While a handful have per student endowments that rival the largest private universities, (Williams, Amherst and Pomona all have per student endowments in excess of $1.8 million), the vast majority have per student endowments in the $40,000 range and many far less.

Most of these schools have high tuition discount rates, often over 50%, so their net tuition revenue is a fraction of posted expense.  They are all limited by size – economies of scale are difficult to achieve. And most operate in highly competitive markets, where the competition is not only other small schools, but also a range of public institutions.

So, what is the underendowed, under resourced small college to do?

The most common initiatives designed to address these sorts of challenges are consortia, collaborative arrangements among institutions designed to increase student options and to share expenses. There are numerous such arrangements, examples being the Colleges of the Fenway in Boston, the Five Colleges of Western Massachusetts, the Washington DC Metropolitan Area Consortium, and the Claremont Colleges in California, among others.

The particulars of each of these groups differ, but there are commonalities. Most are geographically oriented, seeking to take advantage from being near each other. Typically, these groups want to provide more opportunities for students through allowing cross-registrations, sharing certain academic programs or joint student activities. They usually have arrangements for cost-sharing or cost reductions through shared services  for costs like security services, IT, HR, risk management options, pooled purchasing and the like. In other cases (like the Claremont Consortium) they may share libraries or student athletic facilities. Done well, these arrangements can indeed reduce costs while also attracting potential students through wider access to academic options.

However, it is unlikely that such initiatives, no matter how successful, can fundamentally change the basic financial situation of an independent small college. Such shared services savings are necessary and useful, but usually not sufficient to offset the basic enrollment challenge. The financial impact of most consortia is at the margins.

Furthermore, participating institutions have to be on a solid enough financial basis to take part in the first place. Indeed, a consortium like Claremont is based on financial strength. Two of the members have endowments in excess of $1.2 billion (Pomona’s is $2.8 billion.) The endowments of the others range from a low of $67 million (Keck Graduate with 617 students) to Scripps with $460 million for 1100 students.) The Consortium is of clear value to its members, but none of these institutions is on the brink of failure. Rather, all have strong reputations, a fact that provides another important enrollment advantage.

One important factor in these consortia arrangements is that the participating institutions do not have to give up their independence or modify their missions. Their finances, alumni and accreditation are separate.  And while the nature of the arrangement indicates certain levels of compromise and collaboration, their governance remains basically unchanged with independent fiduciary boards.

At the other end of the spectrum are two radically different situations. One is merging with or being acquired by another institution. Prep Scholar counts 33 such events since 2015. (https://blog.prepscholar.com/permanently-closed-colleges-list). Lacking the resources for financial sustainability, many colleges have had no choice but to take such steps.

Merging or being acquired by a financially stronger institution has many advantages. Faculty and staff jobs may be protected. Students can continue with their studies. The institution being acquired may be able to provide continuity in some fashion within the care of the new owner. Endowed funds may continue. The institution’s name may continue as part of an “institute” or “center” within the new owner’s structure. Alumni records can be maintained. Real estate can be transferred. Debts may be paid off and so forth. There are multiple examples of the acquiring institution doing everything possible along these lines.

But some things end. Independent governance and accreditation cease as those functions are subsumed by the acquiring institution. Administrative and admissions staffs are integrated and some programs, people and activities are shed. Operational leadership changes. And over time, what was once a beloved independent institution may well fade away.

The second situation is, bluntly, oblivion. While there are cases of loyal alumni trying to keep an institution alive with new funding, the landscape is replete with institutions that have failed to be financially sustainable.https://www.insidehighered.com/news/governance/executive-leadership/2025/03/27/how-sweet-briar-college-defied-odds-closure. At least 170 smaller institutions have closed in the past two decades. Significantly, it looks like the rate of closure is increasing, in part because of pressures experienced during the pandemic and in part because of continuing enrollment declines.(https://www.highereddive.com/news/how-many-colleges-and-universities-have-closed-since-2016/539379/)

The end of a college is a very sad thing for all involved and, indeed, for society in general. Often a college is an anchor institution in a small community and the loss is felt widely. The closure of a college is akin to the closure of a local factory. As Dean Hoke and others have noted, this is a particular problem for rural communities.

Are there other possible avenues, something between a consortium and a merger or outright closure?

One relatively new model has been organized by two quite different independent institutions, Otterbein University and Antioch University, that came together in 2022 to create the Coalition for the Common Good. Designed to be more than a simple bilateral partnership, the vision of the Coalition is eventually to include several institutions in different locations linked by a common mission and the capacity to grow collective enrollments.

At its core, the Coalition is based on academic symbiosis. Otterbein is a good example of the high-quality traditional undergraduate residential liberal arts institution. It has been well-run and has modest financial resources. Facing the demographic challenges noted earlier (in a state like Ohio that boasts dozens of such institutions), it developed a set of well-regarded graduate programs, notably in nursing and health-related fields, along with locally based teacher education programs and an MBA. However, despite modest success, they faced the limitations of adult programs largely offered in an on-campus model. Regardless of quality, they lacked the capacity to expand such programs beyond Central Ohio.

Antioch University, originally based in Ohio, had evolved over the past 40 years into a more national institution with locations in California, Washington State and New Hampshire offering a set of graduate professional programs to older adults mostly through distance modalities in hybrid or low-residency forms. Antioch, however, was hampered by limited resources including a very small endowment. It had demonstrated the capacity to offer new programs in different areas and fields but lacked the funds necessary for investment to do so.

Within the Coalition, the fundamental arrangement is for Antioch to take over Otterbein’s graduate programs and, with Otterbein financial support, to expand them in other parts of the country. The goal is significant aggregate enrollment growth and sharing of new revenues. While they plan a shared services operation to improve efficiencies and organizational effectiveness, their primary objective is growth. Antioch seeks to build on Otterbein’s successes, particularly with nursing programs. It already has considerable experience in managing academic programs at a distance, a fact that will be central as it develops the Otterbein nursing and health care programs in a new Antioch Graduate School of Nursing and Health Professions.

It is assumed that additional new members of the Coalition will resemble Otterbein in form, thus further increasing opportunities for growth through enhanced reach and greater scale. New members in other geographic locations will provide additional opportunities for expansion. One early success of the Coalition has been the capacity to offer existing Antioch programs in Central Ohio, including joint partnerships with local organizations, health care and educational systems. Crucially, both institutions remain separately accredited with separate governance and leadership under a Coalition joint  “umbrella” structure.

This is not to assert that this model would work for many other institutions. First, many schools with limited graduate programs will be reluctant to “give up” some or all these programs to another partner in the same fashion as Otterbein has with Antioch. Others may not fit geographically, being too remote for expansion of existing programs. Still others may not wish to join a group with an avowed social justice mission.  Finally, as with some consortia, the Coalition arrangement assumes a certain degree of institutional financial stability – it cannot work for institutions on the brink of financial disaster, lest the weakest institution drag down the others.

Are there other organizational variants that are more integrated than consortia, but allow the retention of their independence in ways impossible in a merger or acquisition model? What can be learned from the Coalition initiative that might help others? How might such middle-ground collaboration models be encouraged and supported?

How can philanthropy help?

This is an opportunity for the segments of the philanthropic world to consider possible new initiatives to support the small college elements of the education sector. While there will always be efforts to gain foundation support for individual colleges, there will never be enough money to buttress even a small portion of deserving institutions that face the financial troubles discussed above

Philanthropy should take a sectoral perspective. One key goal should be to find ways to support  smaller institutions in general. Instead of focusing on gifts to particular institutions, those interested in supporting higher education should look at the multiple opportunities for forms of collaborative or collective action. Central to this effort should be exploration of ways of supporting diverse collaborative initiatives. One example would be to provide sufficient backing to a struggling HBCU or women’s college to enable it to be sufficiently stable to participate in a multi-institutional partnership.

As noted, institutional consortia are well established as one avenue for such collaboration. Consortia have existed for many years. There are consortia-based associations that encourage and support consortia efforts. However, every consortium is unique in its own ways, as participating institutions have crafted a specific initiative of a general model to meet their particular situations and need. Consortia can be important structures for many institutions and should be encouraged.

But there is a large middle ground between consortia arrangements and mergers and acquisitions. The Coalition for the Common Good is but one such arrangement and it is still in its early stages. What has been learned from the experience thus far that might be of use to other institutions and groups? How might this middle ground be explored further for the benefit of other institutions?

One thing learned from the Coalition is the complexity of developing a new model for collective action.  Antioch and Otterbein separately pursued individual explorations of options for two or more years before determining that their partnership together should move forward. It then took a full year to get to the point of announcing their plans and another year to complete negotiations and sign completed legal documents and to obtain the necessary accreditor, regulator and Department of Education approvals. The actual implementation of their plans is still in a relatively early stage. In short, it takes time.

It also takes tremendous effort by leadership on both sides, as they must work closely together while continuing to address the daily challenges of their separate institutions. Everyone ends up with at least two major jobs. Communication is vital. Boards must continue to be supportive. The engagement of faculty and staff takes time and can be costly.

What is often referred to as “fit” – the melding of cultures and attitudes at both the institutional and individual levels – is essential. People must be able to work together for shared goals. The burdens of accreditation, while necessary, are time-consuming and multifaceted. There are many things that can go wrong. Indeed, there are examples of planned and announced mergers or collaborations that fall apart before completion.

Philanthropic institutions could support this work in numerous ways, first for specific initiatives and then for the sector, by providing funding and expertise to facilitate new forms of coalitions. These could include:

  • Providing financial support for the collaborative entity. While participating institutions eventually share the costs of creating the new arrangement, modest dedicated support funding could be immensely useful for mitigating the impact of legal expenses, due diligence requirements, initial management of shared efforts and expanded websites.
  • Providing support for expert advice. The leaders of two institutions seeking partnership need objective counsel on matters financial, legal, organizational, accreditation and more. Provision of expertise for distance education models is often a high priority, since many small colleges have limited experience with these.
  • Funding research. There are multiple opportunities for research and its dissemination. What works? What does not? How can lessons learned by disseminated?
  • Supporting communication through publications, workshops, conferences and other venues.
  • Developing training workshops for boards, leadership, staff and faculty in institutions considering collaborations.
  • Crafting a series of institutional incentives through seed grant awards to provide support for institutions just beginning to consider these options.
  • These types of initiatives might be separate, or they might be clustered into a national center to support and promote collaboration.

These and other ideas could be most helpful to many institutions exploring collaboration. Above all, it is important to undertake such explorations before it is too late, before the financial situation becomes so dire that there are few, if any, choices.

Conclusions

This middle ground is not a panacea. The harsh reality is that not all institutions can be saved. It takes a certain degree of stability and a sufficient financial base to even consider consortia or middle ground arrangements like the Coalition for the Common Good. Merging with or being acquired by stronger institutions is not a worst-case scenario – there are often plenty of reasons, not just financial, that this form of change makes great sense for a smaller, weaker institution.

It is also important for almost all institutions, even those with significant endowment resources, to be thinking about possible options. The stronger the institution, the stronger the resistance to such perspectives is likely to be. There are examples of wealthy undergraduate institutions with $1 billion endowments that are losing significant sums annually in their operating budgets. Such endowments often act like a giant pillow, absorbing the institutional challenges and preventing boards and leaders from facing difficult decisions until it may be too late. Every board should be considering possible future options.

In the face of likely government rollbacks of support, the ongoing demographic challenges for smaller institutions and the general uncertainties in some circle about the importance of higher education itself, independent private higher education must be more creative and assertive about its future. Also, it is essential to remember that the existential financial challenges facing these institutions predate the current Presidential Administration and certainly will remain once it has passed into history.

Just trying to compete more effectively for enrollments will not be sufficient. Neither will simply reducing expense budgets. New collaborative models are needed. Consortia have roles to play. The example of the Coalition for the Common Good may show new directions forward. Anyone who supports the diversity of American higher education institutions should work to find new ways of assuring financial stability while adhering to academic principles and core missions.


Chet Haskell is an independent higher education consultant. Most recently, he was Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs and University Provost at Antioch University and Vice President for Graduate Programs of the Coalition for the Common Good.

Unintended Consequences: How the House Budget Threatens Student-Athletes

A Uniquely American Model Under Threat

June 8, 2025, by Dean Hoke: Intercollegiate athletics occupy a powerful and unique place in American higher education—something unmatched in any other country. From the massive media contracts of Division I football to the community pride surrounding NAIA and NJCAA basketball, college sports are a defining feature of the American academic landscape. Unlike most nations, where elite athletic development happens in clubs or academies, the U.S. integrates competitive sports directly into its college campuses.

This model is more than tradition; it’s an engine of opportunity. For many high school students—especially those from underserved backgrounds—the chance to play college sports shapes where they apply, enroll, and succeed. According to the NCAA, 35% of high school athletes say the ability to participate in athletics is a key factor in their college decision [1]. It’s not just about scholarships; it’s about identity, community, and believing their talents matter.

At smaller colleges and two-year institutions, athletics often serves as a key enrollment driver and differentiator in a crowded marketplace. International students, too, are drawn to the American system for its academic-athletic fusion, contributing tuition revenue and global prestige. Undermining this model through sweeping changes to federal financial aid, without considering the downstream effects, risks more than athletic participation. It threatens a distinctively American approach to education, access, and aspiration.

A New Threshold with Big Impacts

Currently, students taking 12 credit hours per semester are considered full-time and eligible for the maximum Pell Grant, which stands at $7,395 for 2024-25 [2]. The proposed House budget raises this threshold to 15 credit hours per semester. For student-athletes, whose schedules are already packed with training, competition, and travel, this shift could be devastating.

NCAA academic standards require student-athletes to maintain full-time enrollment (typically 12 hours) and make satisfactory academic progress [3]. Adding another three credit hours per term may force many to choose between academic integrity, athletic eligibility, and physical well-being. In sports like basketball, where teams frequently travel for games, or in demanding STEM majors, completing 15 credit hours consistently can be a formidable challenge.

Financial Impact on Student-Athletes

Key Proposed Changes Affecting Student-Athletes:

  • Pell Grant Reductions: The proposed budget aims to cut the maximum Pell Grant by $1,685, reducing it to $5,710 for the 2026–27 academic year. Additionally, eligibility criteria would become more stringent, requiring students to enroll in at least 15 credit hours per semester to qualify for full-time awards. These changes could result in approximately 700,000 students losing Pell Grant eligibility [4].
  • Elimination of Subsidized Loans: The budget proposes eliminating subsidized federal student loans, which currently do not accrue interest while a student is in school. This change would force students to rely more on unsubsidized loans or private lending options, potentially increasing their debt burden [5].
  • Cuts to Work-Study and SEOG Programs: The Federal Work-Study program and Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grants (SEOG) are slated for significant reductions or elimination. These programs provide essential financial support to low-income students, and their removal could affect over 1.6 million students [6].
  • Institutional Risk-Sharing: A new provision would require colleges to repay a portion of defaulted student loans, introducing a financial penalty for institutions with high default rates. This could strain budgets, especially at smaller colleges with limited resources [7].

Figure 1: Total student-athletes by national athletic organization (NCAA, NAIA, NJCAA).

While Figure 1 highlights the total number of student-athletes in each organization, Figure 2 illustrates how deeply athletics is embedded in different types of institutions. NAIA colleges have the highest ratio, with student-athletes comprising 39% of undergraduate enrollment. Division III institutions follow at approximately 8.42%, and the NJCAA—serving mostly commuter and low-income students—relies on athletics for 8.58% of its total student base [8].

Even Division I, with its large student populations, includes a meaningful share (2.49%) of student-athletes. These proportions underscore how vital athletics are to institutional identity, especially in small colleges and two-year schools where athletes often make up a significant portion of campus life, retention strategy, and tuition revenue.

Figure 2: Percentage of student-athletes among total undergraduate enrollment by organization (NCAA Divisions I–III, NAIA, NJCAA).

The Pell Grant Profile: Who’s Affected

Pell Grants support students with the greatest financial need. According to a 2018 report, approximately 31.3% of Division I scholarship athletes receive Pell Grants. At individual institutions like Ohio State, the share is even higher: 47% of football players and over 50% of women’s basketball players. In the broader NCAA system, over 48% of athletes received some form of federal need-based aid in recent years [9].

There are approximately 665,000 student-athletes attending college. The NCAA reports that more than 520,000 student-athletes currently participate in championship-level intercollegiate athletics across Divisions I, II, and III [10]. The National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA) oversees approximately 83,000 student-athletes [11], while the National Junior College Athletic Association (NJCAA) supports around 60,000 student-athletes at two-year colleges [12].

The NAIA and NJCAA systems, which serve many first-generation, low-income, and minority students, also have a high reliance on Pell Grant support. However, exact figures are less widely published.

The proposed redefinition of “full-time” means many of these students could lose up to $1,479 per year in aid, based on projections from policy experts [13]. For low-income students, this gap often determines whether they can afford to continue their education.

Fewer Credits, Fewer Dollars: Academic and Athletic Risks

Another major concern is how aid calculations based on “completed” credit hours will penalize students who drop a class mid-semester or fail a course. Even if a student-athlete enrolls in 15 credits, failing or withdrawing from a single 3-credit course could drop their award amount [14]. This adds pressure to persist in academically unsuitable courses, potentially hurting long-term academic outcomes.

Athletic departments, already burdened by compliance and recruitment pressures, may face added strain. Advisors will need to help students navigate increasingly complex eligibility and aid requirements, shifting focus from performance and development to credit-hour management.

Disproportionate Effects on Small Colleges and Non-Revenue Sports

The brunt of these changes will fall hardest on small, tuition-dependent institutions in the NCAA Division II, Division III, NAIA, and NJCAA. These colleges often use intercollegiate athletics as a strategic enrollment tool. At some NAIA schools, student-athletes comprise 40% to 60% of the undergraduate population [8].

Unlike large Division I schools that benefit from lucrative media contracts and booster networks, these institutions rely on a patchwork of tuition, modest athletic scholarships, and federal aid to keep programs running. A reduction in Pell eligibility could drive enrollment declines, lead to cuts in athletic offerings, and even force some colleges to close sports programs or entire campuses.

Already, schools like San Francisco State University, Cleveland State, and Mississippi College have recently announced program eliminations, citing budgetary constraints [15]. NJCAA institutions—the two-year colleges serving over 85,000 student-athletes—also face a precarious future under this proposed budget.

Economic Importance by Division

Division I: Athletics departments generated nearly $17.5 billion in total revenue in 2022, with $11.2 billion self-generated and $6.3 billion subsidized by institutional/government support or student fees [16]. Many Power Five schools are financially resilient, with revenue from TV contracts, merchandise, and ticket sales.

Division II: Median revenue for schools with football was around $6.9 million, but generated athletic revenue averaged only $528,000, leading to significant deficits subsidized by institutional funds [17].

Division III: Division III schools operate on leaner budgets, with no athletic scholarships and total athletics budgets often under $3 million per school. These programs are typically funded like other academic departments [18].

NAIA and NJCAA: These schools rely heavily on student-athlete enrollment to sustain their institutions. Athletics are not profit centers but recruitment and retention tools. Without Pell Grants, many of these athletes cannot afford to enroll [11][12].

Figure 3: Estimated number of NAIA, Division III, and NJCAA programs by state.

Unintended Tradeoffs: Equity and Resource Redistribution

Attempting to offset lost federal aid by reallocating institutional grants could result in aid being shifted away from non-athletes. This risks eroding equity goals, as well as provoking internal tension on campuses where athletes are perceived to receive preferential treatment.

Without new revenue sources, institutions may also raise tuition or increase tuition discounting, potentially compromising their financial stability. In essence, colleges may be forced to choose who gets to stay in school.

The High-Stakes Gamble for Student-Athletes

Figure 4: Estimated impact of Pell Grant changes on student-athletes, including projected dropouts and loan default rates.

For many student-athletes, especially those from low-income backgrounds, the Pell Grant is not just helpful—it’s essential. It makes the dream of attending college, competing in athletics, and earning a degree financially feasible. If the proposed changes to Pell eligibility become law, an estimated 50,000 student-athletes could be forced to drop out, unable to meet the new credit-hour requirements or fill the funding gap [19]. Those who remain may have no choice but to take on additional loans, risking long-term debt for a degree they may never complete. The reality is sobering: Pell recipients already face long-term student loan default rates as high as 27%, and for those who drop out, that figure climbs above 40% [20]. Stripping away vital support will almost certainly drive those numbers higher. The consequences won’t stop with individual students. Colleges—particularly smaller, tuition-dependent institutions where athletes make up a significant share of enrollment—stand to lose not just revenue, but the very programs and communities that give purpose to their campuses.

Colleges, athletic associations, policymakers, and communities must work together to safeguard opportunity. Student-athletes should never be forced to choose between academic success and financial survival. Preserving access to both education and athletics isn’t just about individual futures—it’s about upholding a uniquely American pathway to achievement and equity.


Dean Hoke is Managing Partner of Edu Alliance Group, a higher education consultancy. He formerly served as President/CEO of the American Association of University Administrators (AAUA). With decades of experience in higher education leadership, consulting, and institutional strategy, he brings a wealth of knowledge on small colleges’ challenges and opportunities. Dean is the Executive Producer and co-host for the podcast series Small College America. 

References

  1. NCAA. (n.d.). Estimated probability of competing in college athletics. Retrieved from https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2021/11/4/estimated-probability-of-competing-in-college-athletics.aspx
  2. Federal Student Aid. (2024). Federal Pell Grants. Retrieved from https://studentaid.gov/understand-aid/types/grants/pell
  3. NCAA. (n.d.). Academic Standards and Eligibility. Retrieved from https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2021/6/17/academic-eligibility.aspx
  4. Washington Post. (2025, May 17). Most Pell Grant recipients to get less money under Trump budget bill, CBO finds. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2025/05/17/pell-grants-cbo-analysis/
  5. NASFAA. (2024). Reconciliation Deep Dive: House Committee Proposes Major Overhaul of Federal Student Loans, Repayment, and PSLF. Retrieved from https://www.nasfaa.org/news-item/36202/Reconciliation_Deep_Dive_House_Committee_Proposes_Major_Overhaul_of_Federal_Student_Loans_Repayment_and_PSLF?utm
  6. U.S. Department of Education, FY2025 Budget Summary. (2024). Proposed Cuts to Campus-Based Aid Programs. Retrieved from https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/index.html
  7. Congressional Budget Office. (2025). Reconciliation Recommendations of the House Committee on Education and the Workforce. Retrieved from https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61412
  8. NJCAA, NAIA, and NCAA. (2023). Student-Athlete Participation Reports.
  9. NCAA. (2018). Pell Grant data and athlete demographics. Retrieved from https://www.ncaa.org/news/2018/4/24/research-pell-grant-data-shows-diversity-in-division-i.aspx
  10. NCAA. (2023). 2022–23 Sports Sponsorship and Participation Rates Report. Retrieved from https://www.ncaa.org/research
  11. NAIA. (2023). NAIA Facts and Figures. Retrieved from https://www.naia.org
  12. NJCAA. (2023). About the NJCAA. Retrieved from https://www.njcaa.org
  13. The Institute for College Access & Success (TICAS). (2024). Analysis of Proposed Pell Grant Reductions. Retrieved from https://ticas.org
  14. Education Trust. (2024). Consequences of Redefining Full-Time Status for Financial Aid. Retrieved from https://edtrust.org
  15. ESPN. (2024, March); AP News. (2024, November). Athletic program eliminations at Cleveland State and Mississippi College.
  16. Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics. (2023). College Athletics Financial Information (CAFI). Retrieved from https://knightnewhousedata.org
  17. NCAA. (2022). Division II Finances: Revenues and Expenses Report. Retrieved from https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2022/6/17/finances.aspx
  18. NCAA. (2023). Division III Budget Reports and Trends. Retrieved from https://www.ncaa.org
  19. Internal projection based on available data from NCAA, NAIA, NJCAA, and CBO Pell Grant impact estimates.
  20. Brookings Institution. (2018). The looming student loan default crisis is worse than we thought. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-looming-student-loan-default-crisis-is-worse-than-we-thought