Tag: college Mergers

Posted on

Issues of Institutional Governance in Partnerships

March 2, 2026, By Chet Haskell– Institutional governance – its form, structures, members, by-laws, and responsibilities – is an essential element of any organization. The manner by which missions are defined how decisions are made about personnel, programs, policies, and finances is crucial in every corporate and non-profit setting.

Clarity about governance is especially important in the highly regulated world of private higher education, where accrediting bodies have standards that control most aspects of institutional life, including, crucially, access to Federal government Title IV student aid, the lifeblood of most colleges and universities.

The principal accrediting bodies permit a range of possible governance models beyond that of the traditional single independent college or university. But they all come down to clarity about organizational structures and the processes by which decisions are made. For example, the WASC Senior College and University Commission (WSCUC) highlights the key features of a governance model for such an institution as:

Operating with “appropriate autonomy governed by an independent board or similar authority that is responsible for mission, integrity and oversight of planning, policies, performance and sustainability”. (From Accreditation Standard 3 WSCUC)

Types of Partnerships and Governance Challenges

But how does this apply and play out in more complex organizational models? A growing number of independent institutions are engaging in (or seeking to engage in) a variety of partnership models that range from consortia to outright mergers or acquisitions. There also are efforts aimed at a middle path between a relatively simple sharing of services and complete absorption of one into another. This essay will explore some of these models, always keeping in mind basic governance principles.

A successful partnership between two academic institutions requires alignment in many areas. First, of course, the financial aspects of a potential agreement must come together. The numbers must add up and work to both partners’ advantage. The deal must pencil out.

But much more is involved than straightforward budgeting matters. There are two additional broad alignments that are necessary. One is the alignment of missions and cultures. This is essential in higher education if the multiple constituencies of any institution are to be engaged. The other is implementation. It is one thing to reach a deal. It is another to implement it, especially since making an agreement a reality is fraught with complexities, external requirements such as accreditation and the natural emotions inherent in any such plan.

Sometimes two or more institutions to agree to cost-sharing arrangements and other agreements that fall short of complete institutional involvement. There are, after all, numerous examples of multi-school consortia around the country, where cooperating institutions come to mutually beneficial arrangements while maintaining their full institutional independence. Two examples are the Claremont Consortium and the Community Solution Education System (formerly The Chicago School). As will be will be discussed below, despite being very different in formal structure, these and many other like arrangements seek to gain advantages through cooperation without ceding full institutional independence

However, moving beyond such cooperative ventures requires resolution of a variety of institutional governance challenges. The traditional model of American higher education assumes unitary institutional control resting in the hands of a self-replicating fiduciary board of trustees. As noted, this model is underscored by the standards of accrediting bodies (and, usually, state laws as well), which require clarity as to a board’s roles and structures.

Non-profit college and university boards are composed of volunteers, often alumni of the institution at hand. Indeed, paid trustees are usually forbidden. These individuals bring many things to the institution –expertise, connections, money, experienced guidance – as part of their commitment and service. There are thousands of examples of the essential contributions of these dedicated parties.

Faced with situations of institutional crisis– almost always financial in nature –these volunteer boards hold in their hands the interests and futures of students, faculty, staff, alumni and many others. Decisions they make may enable an institution to prosper and continue independently. Failure to make the right decisions may well lead to institutional closure. In times of such crisis, it often makes sense for boards to look for partnership arrangements that often lead to merger or acquisition with another institution.

Partnerships and Organizational Change

More likely is some form of merger or acquisition or similar arrangement that has one vital characteristic: a change in institutional governance, including at the board level.  As noted above, financial arrangements are necessary, but not sufficient requirements. The actual process of assessing mission and cultural fit between two institutions is much more difficult and is at the heart of any partnership with a chance of success. And even if those two conditions are met, the complex and time-consuming task of implementation requires leadership, patience and continued effort.

The board of trustees of each institution is central to all of these steps. It is here that the structure of governance is so important. In almost all cases, the role of an institution’s board will change and successful change is necessary for a successful partnership.

Mergers of two institutions are common. And even if outright acquisition is not the case, there is always a senior or dominating partner. This partner will be the financially stronger institution and, as elsewhere, those who have the gold make the rules.

While there are limited examples of true equal partnerships in higher education, the much more common model calls for one institution to cede most, if not all, of its independence to another. If the situation is an acquisition, the acquired institution will lose its independent board as it is absorbed by the other. While an advisory committee or other fig leaf arrangement may continue, the acquiring institution is fully and legally in charge and thus fully responsible for making the acquisition work.

There may be certain adjustments designed to assure the interests of the more junior institution, such as some seats on the senior institution’s board, the establishment of an entity to carry on the junior institution’s name or the transfer of certain key personnel. Sometimes there are separate endowed funds.

Crucially, the smaller institution will cease to exist legally. Its name, programs, mission and people may continue in the new structure. For example, University of Health Sciences and Pharmacy St. Louis very recently announced its acquisition by Washington University St. Louis. The latter will close the non-pharmacy elements of the former and will integrate the pharmacy programs as “its College of Pharmacy.”  The pharmacy program will continue but  University of Health Sciences St. Louis and its fiduciary board will disappear. This is common in the many cases of absorption of all or part of one institution into another.

Giving up institutional independence and control is a dilemma: become part of something bigger or face possible closure. While no institution wants to close, boards are responsible for the interests of students first and thus generally will seek a partnership solution, even if it means the end of the institution’s independence and governance.

Entering into a merger situation is not a decision to be taken lightly and is fraught with difficulty for the more junior partner. Students face disruption and change. Faculty and staff members usually face the possibility of losing their jobs, as the senior institution is unlikely to integrate the junior institution without changes. Alumni are usually distraught as part of their identity fades away. Some people may wish to fight the agreement with last-ditch (and usually unsuccessful) efforts to find an alternative path. The communities in which the institution is located will worry about the implications of change for the local economy, local institutions and citizens.

The institution’s board of trustees must deal with all this change, uncertainty, loss and, in many cases, anger. Since many trustees may be alumni, they have particularly strong emotional connections. And, at the end of the day, most such partnerships lead to the dissolution of one board. While board dissolution is also the outcome of a closure, a board can and should take solace in being able to steer the institution into a safer harbor.

There have been efforts to move towards cooperative arrangements that do not require board dissolution. A noted, there are examples of mergers of equals. One of the best known is Case Western Reserve University founded in 1967 through a merger of Western Reserve (founded 1826) and Case Institute of Technology (1880). Other examples include Carnegie Mellon University (1967), University of Detroit Mercy (1980), and Washington and Jefferson C(1865).

In another case, Atlanta University (1865) and Clark College (1879) were independent parts of the Atlanta University Center, a consortium also involving Morehouse, Spelman and Morris Brown Colleges, as well as Gammon Seminary. In 1988, Atlanta University and Clark College consolidated to become Clark Atlanta University, primarily a research institution that serves as the graduate school for the other Atlanta University Center members.

Nevertheless, such mergers of equals have not been the case in recent years. Instead, the growing financial challenges and the increased regulatory requirements have made such a model rare.

The development of consortia has been a characteristic of groups of institutions with shared interests and opportunities for savings and efficiencies through shared service agreements, as well as expanded academic opportunities for students. The Claremont Consortium involves seven co-located institutions that share various administrative services, facilities and the like, while working together to increase student options. (Their motto is: “Seven Institutions, Infinite Choices.” At the same time, they always operate as independent colleges with separate boards and accreditation. Variations on this model can be found in other consortia nationally.

A somewhat different example is the Community Solution Education System (CSES), which includes six separate, institutions, but serves as the single provider of a wide range of services including information technology, marketing, enrollment management, admissions support, and related services, all  for set fees. The CSES central operation can provide such services at scale and with great effect, thereby enabling the individual schools to grow to sustainability. Again, like looser consortia arrangements, the boards of the separate schools operate independently and their accreditations are separate.

There is a recent alternative model, the Coalition for the Common Good founded by Otterbein and Antioch Universities in 2023. Designed to be more than a bilateral arrangement, the Coalition plans to expand to several partners in the coming years. The Coalition model may resemble a consortium in some ways. There is a shared services subsidiary designed for cost-sharing purposes. And, crucially, both founding institutions maintain their separate status with accreditors and the US Department of Education. This means both institutions maintain their separate boards to oversee the management of their separate operations.

Coalition activities are several. Some are simply cooperative (communication, joint non-academic initiatives). But others require true shared governance. These include the shift of academic programs and personnel and, crucially, the implementation of the financial aspects of the agreement. A central element of the Coalition model is for most Otterbein graduate programs (largely in nursing and healthcare) to shift to Antioch control. The goal is to use Antioch’s multiple locations and distance education experience to expand these programs in ways impossible for Otterbein.

The initial governance structure is a bit complex. There is a new Coalition board that has equal representation from both Otterbein and Antioch (four each) and a single independent member. This board appoints the president of the Coalition and otherwise oversees Coalition initiatives.

The straightforward model for something like the Coalition is for the separate boards to operate independently as before except for having ceded certain specified powers to the Coalition board, such as restrictions on excessive debt or certain property transactions. The umbrella Coalition board would appoint a president of the Coalition and the separate boards would appoint separate institutional presidents with the concurrence of the Coalition board.

This approach creates complex challenges as the Coalition model expands, since adding a third, fourth or fifth member on the same model would become unwieldy. This is a challenge the Coalition will have to address in negotiations with additional members.

One can readily see the difficulties with these different approaches. WSCUC, for example, addressed this in an accreditation review of Pacific Oaks College, a member of the CSES system. Noting a grey area, the WSCUC Commission called for steps “to ensure boundaries between provision of services and the management of the college are maintained.” (WASC Commission letter, March 2014) In effect, the Commission is warning about the importance of autonomy of the governing board.

Yet, the desire to collaborate will require changes and sacrifices.  This also is true in the public sector, even though the governance challenges are different. There are numerous state university multi-institution systems. For example, in California, the University of California is a unitary system of ten large and prominent units. However, there is only one Board of Regents for the entire system, along with a system president and various central systems functions.

The composite entities (UCLA, for example) have system-appointed Chancellors with significant independent powers and responsibilities for their unit within the system. They are separately accredited institutions. But they do not have separate fiduciary boards, although there are various advisory groups. The accrediting body (WSCUC) has specific standards for governance of multi-campus institutions. (Recall that the University of California predates WSCUC, as is the case with many multi-campus systems elsewhere.)

A different example is the 2022 decision of the Pennsylvania State system to impose the merger of three smaller campus units into what is now called PennWest. While in some ways similar to the merger of a small private institution, the governance issues were all within the purview of a unitary public system.

Lessons

The lessons to be drawn from this are two. First, systems of private institutions with de facto independent boards and leadership are possible, following the public sector model. Indeed, there are examples of private groups functioning in this general framework

The second is that boards seeking to assure the future of their institution will have to face certain realities. The most likely path – mergers of some sort – will mean surrendering some or all board governance in at least one of the partner institutions. Paths that result in strong partnerships with separate governance are difficult and complex, but not impossible. Creative institutions will seek to explore them and regulatory bodies should attempt to accommodate such new paths. The duty to at least explore these paths is incumbent upon any institution facing existential challenges. It is the only responsible direction in times of change and challenge. Failure to do so represents a shirking of responsibilities and, potentially, closure.

Concluding Thoughts About Accrediting Bodies

A final word about the roles of accrediting bodies in matters of merger and partnership. Accrediting bodies are sympathetic to struggling institutions, as their first responsibility always is to students. As long as they can see a way forward for a school, they try to be helpful. The same is true with state and Federal governments that certainly do not wish to see students lose educational pathways after having incurred student loan debt.

As should be clear, most parties – institutional boards, accreditors, government overseers – see mergers and partnerships as highly preferable to closures. Some observers have suggested accreditors should be able to serve as matchmakers with potential partners of a school in trouble. However, accreditors typically treat each institution in isolation and have not sought the matchmaker role. At the same time, struggling institutions are not always transparent with their accreditors. They worry that if the accreditor knew the true situation of a school in trouble, it might impose some sort of sanction that might make things worse. Complete candor with an accreditor may sometimes be feared as a way of inviting accreditor discipline, a step that will make everything harder, including finding a potential partner that will not be even more nervous about a merger possibility with a struggling school. Candor also can create self-fulfilling prophecies that accelerate crisis.

Yet it is in no one’s interest that a school should fail. Students, employees, communities, alumni and all of higher education lose. Yet, the economics and challenges today – particularly for smaller institutions – create situations where greater accreditor engagement may play crucial roles in institutional survival through enabling or facilitating some form of partnership or merger. Treating every institution as a separate case may be counterproductive in the coming era of institutional consolidation.

Everyone – not just boards of trustees or college president-should care about these challenges. Exploring and supporting different forms of partnership should be on everyone’s minds.

Dr. Chet Haskell serves as Co-Head for the College Partnerships and Alliances for the Edu Alliance Group. Chet is a higher education leader with extensive experience in academic administration, institutional strategy, and governance. He recently completed six and a half years as Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs and University Provost at Antioch University, where he played a central role in creating the Coalition for the Common Good with Otterbein University. Earlier in his career, he spent 13 years at Harvard University in senior academic positions, including Executive Director of the Center for International Affairs and Associate Dean of the Kennedy School of Government. He later served as Dean of the College at Simmons College and as President of both the Monterey Institute of International Studies and Cogswell Polytechnical College, successfully guiding both institutions through mergers.

An experienced consultant, Dr. Haskell has advised universities and ministries of education in the United States, Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East on issues of finance, strategy, and accreditation. His teaching and research have focused on leadership and nonprofit governance, with a particular emphasis on helping smaller institutions adapt to financial and structural challenges.
He earned DPA and MPA degrees from the University of Southern California, an MA from the University of Virginia, and an AB cum laude from Harvard University.

Posted on

From Silent Stakeholders to Strategic Partners: Donor Engagement in College Mergers

November 2, 2025, By Dean Hoke — When Sweet Briar College’s trustees voted to close in 2015, they framed the decision as a financial necessity. Alumnae mounted an extraordinary campaign—raising $28.5 million in 110 days—and, through a state-brokered settlement, the college reopened under new governance. By 2023, donors had contributed well over $133 million since the crisis. What looked like an inevitable failure became one of higher education’s most remarkable turnarounds.

Sweet Briar is not only a story of crisis response; it exposes a recurring miscalculation in today’s merger conversations: the assumption that boardroom consensus equals donor legitimacy. Trustees speak for donors in a fiduciary sense—they hold legal responsibility for institutional assets—but not in the communal sense that captures sentiment, legacy, and trust. When colleges announce merger talks, headlines dwell on enrollment curves and debt ratios. Yet behind every deal stands a quieter, decisive constituency: major donors, family foundations, and planned-giving benefactors whose confidence (or loss of it) can determine whether the combined institution thrives—or limps forward under the weight of broken relationships.

This article reframes mergers as philanthropic integration projects. The legal mechanics matter, but durable success is won in the design phase: early engagement with philanthropic stakeholders, explicit safeguards for identity and donor intent, transparent transition planning, and a mission-first case that invites continued—and new—investment. When leaders bring donors and alumni into the architecture of the merger rather than the press release, they convert anxiety into commitment and preserve the institutional DNA that constituents care about most.

We’ll see this principle in contrasting cases: mission-advancing acquisitions that attracted significant philanthropic support, integrations that prioritized identity and donor intent from the outset, and lessons from failed or contested processes. The throughline is simple: treat philanthropy as a core workstream—not an afterthought—and the odds of a credible, sustainable merger rise dramatically.

Why Donor Engagement Matters More Than Ever

The stakes have never been higher. Survey data from Ruffalo Noel Levitz’s 2025 National Alumni Survey, which surveyed more than 50,000 alumni, reveals that donor relationships with higher education are already strained. While 81% of alumni report that being philanthropic is important to them personally and 77% make charitable donations, their connection to their alma mater has weakened dramatically. Only 31% of alumni who donate to any charity gave to their alma mater last year, dropping to just 19% among Millennials and 10% among Gen Z graduates.

Even more troubling: 59% of alumni who never donate to their alma mater actively support other causes, as do 83% of lapsed donors. They have not stopped giving—they have simply redirected their philanthropy elsewhere. This suggests that alumni disengagement reflects institutional failure rather than generational selfishness.

Satisfaction drives everything. Alumni who report being ‘very satisfied’ with their student experience are 18 times more likely to donate than neutral respondents and 73 times more likely than dissatisfied graduates. Yet only 42% of Gen Z alumni report feeling ‘very satisfied’ with their experience, compared to 72% of Silent Generation graduates.

Mergers test already-fragile relationships. When institutions announce consolidation, donors who felt lukewarm about their undergraduate experience see confirmation that their alma mater is failing. A merger framed solely as a financial necessity will not inspire them. But a merger presented as advancing mission-driven impact—expanding access, strengthening programs that address social challenges, or preserving an educational model under threat—can mobilize support from the very alumni who have drifted away.

What History Already Taught Us (and We Often Forget)

As Millett (1976) noted, successful integrations often ‘show structure, not just sentiment’—for example, Case Western Reserve kept a distinct Case Institute identity, and Carnegie Mellon created a Carnegie Institute of Engineering and a Mellon Institute of Science to carry legacies forward.

A half-century ago, John D. Millett’s 1976 analysis of U.S. college mergers examined a range of cases—from research institutes to liberal arts colleges—and distilled lessons that remain strikingly current. Four observations deserve renewed attention today:

1. Endowments transfer; relationships do not. In many mergers, endowments and restricted funds move to successor institutions through standard legal pathways. The mechanics are manageable. The harder work is relational: ensuring donors can see how their original intent will be honored in the new configuration, and that the program or ethos they loved will not be erased.

2. Alumni skepticism is predictable—and manageable. Leaders should not assume alumni approval, especially when the smaller institution is absorbed. Visible steps to cultivate and retain legacy alumni—keeping familiar staff contacts for a transitional period, acknowledging a distinct identity, and offering tangible ways to shape the merged future—go a long way.

3. Governance approval is not donor legitimacy. Even when boards vote, state bodies concur, and presidents sign, philanthropic legitimacy remains a separate test. Communities expect to be consulted; they often oppose mergers if they learn about them too late. Participation must be planned early, not added later.

4. Language and structure matter more than sentiment. Labels and explanations—federation versus absorption, mission expansion versus rescue—shape how alumni and donors interpret the outcome. Leaders who explain clear educational benefits and who visibly protect identity through formal structures earn trust faster.

Historical Examples: Structure, Not Just Sentiment

After the Case Institute of Technology and Western Reserve University merger, the successor Case Western Reserve University continued the designation of Case Institute of Technology as an organizational component. At Carnegie Mellon University, leaders created a Carnegie Institute of Engineering and a Mellon Institute of Science—formal structures that carried legacy identities forward within the new entity.

The Bellarmine-Ursuline (Louisville) merger (1968-1971) offers another instructive example. The combined institution briefly used the Bellarmine-Ursuline name before reverting to Bellarmine College in 1971, but Bellarmine has continued to honor Ursuline identity through durable structures—explicitly including Ursuline alumnae in alumni awards and honors and recognizing the Ursuline legacy through commemorations and alumni programming. These are structural signals that preserve identity even when the combined name does not persist.

Millett also notes that successor institutions often made special effort to cultivate and retain alumni of the absorbed college, including keeping an alumni-relations officer from the legacy institution and providing a special alumni designation or status—practical ways to keep traditions and community intact during transition.

Three Models Leaders Use—and Which One Works

Crisis-Reactive: What Not to Do

Planning is done privately, the announcement is abrupt, and donors are asked to accept a fait accompli. Mills College’s merger with Northeastern University proceeded despite alumni resistance, prompting legal challenges over donor intent. The Alumnae Association spent hundreds of thousands in legal fees opposing the merger, and a class action lawsuit resulted in a $1.25 million settlement. The litigation divided alumnae and consumed resources that could have been invested in the merged institution’s success.

Even when the legal mechanics are sound, the community verdict is that identity has been erased. The result: backlash, donor-intent disputes, and years of costly trust repair.

Compliance-Only: Necessary but Insufficient

Teams carefully inventory restricted funds, ensure transfers align with donor intent, and communicate the basics. This prevents disasters but rarely generates enthusiasm or new investment. Survey data reveals that 70% of alumni need to believe their gift amount matters, and 66% rate the ability to see how their gift is used as critical. When a college merges, donors worry their legacy has been erased—regardless of legal assurances that funds will be protected.

The compliance model maintains existing donors but does not mobilize new support for the merged institution’s expanded mission. The message is ‘We will comply,’ not ‘Here is a better future you can help build.’

Strategic Partnership: The Target State

Donors and foundations are treated as co-creators from Day 0. Leaders conduct quiet briefings with major benefactors pre-announcement, frame the merger as mission expansion, and embed structural commitments to legacy preservation. This model doesn’t eliminate hard feelings, but it channels energy toward shared outcomes.

Delaware State University–Wesley College (2020–21). DSU—an HBCU—acquired Wesley and framed the move as mission advancement, launching the Wesley College of Health & Behavioral Sciences to expand pathways in nursing and allied health for underserved students. Financing combined philanthropy and prudence: a $20M unrestricted gift from MacKenzie Scott (with a portion—reported as roughly one-third of the $15M total—applied to transition costs) and a $1M Longwood Foundation grant for the acquisition. The case shows how a mission-first narrative can catalyze major-donor and foundation support.

By tying dollars to a new health‑workforce pipeline—rather than balance‑sheet triage—leaders converted donor anxiety into visible, restricted impact.

Ursuline College–Gannon University (ongoing). From the outset, both institutions engaged stakeholders publicly and affirmed philanthropy principles: “Honoring donor intent is important to Gannon University,” and donors will be able to designate gifts to the Pepper Pike campus. Ursuline will retain its identity as the Ursuline College Campus of Gannon University after the transition, and the Ursuline Sisters of Cleveland have voiced support for the merger—signals aimed at preserving community trust and legacy while the integration proceeds through 2026. These commitments, paired with the HLC’s Change-of-Control approval, frame the merger as continuity-minded rather than absorptive.

University of Tennessee Southern (formerly Martin Methodist College).

University of Tennessee Southern (formerly Martin Methodist College)
When Martin Methodist joined the University of Tennessee System in 2021, leaders prioritized transparent, compassionate communication—“a liminal space” requiring a strong plan, as President Mark La Branche put it. They also set aside portions of the legacy endowment (via the Martin Methodist College Foundation) to protect signature programs, showing that integration need not erase institutional identity.

Public commitments to donor intent and the campus naming convention did early legitimacy work that legal filings can’t.

Engaging the Acquiring Institution’s Donors

When a stronger institution absorbs a struggling one, leaders often assume donor concerns belong primarily to the acquired institution. This is a strategic error. The acquiring institution’s donors also have a stake in the outcome—and their continued support is essential to merger success.

Major donors to the acquiring institution may question why resources should be directed toward absorbing another college. They may worry that the acquired institution’s struggles will tarnish their alma mater’s reputation, or that merger costs will compete with planned campus improvements. These concerns are legitimate and require proactive engagement.

Frame the Merger as a Strategic Opportunity

The narrative for acquiring institution donors must emphasize strategic opportunity rather than charitable rescue. Several frames can be effective:

Geographic expansion: The merger creates a presence in a new market, expanding the institution’s reach and visibility.

Program complementarity: The acquired institution brings academic strengths that fill gaps in the acquiring institution’s portfolio.

Mission advancement: The merger expands capacity to serve students and fulfill the educational mission on a greater scale.

Competitive positioning: In an era of consolidation, the merger strengthens the institution’s competitive position and long-term sustainability.

Rather than waiting for resistance to emerge, acquiring institution leaders should brief major donors before public announcement. These confidential conversations acknowledge donors’ legitimate interest in institutional strategy, allow leaders to address concerns directly, and create opportunities for donors to become merger advocates.

Legal clarity: When restricted funds cannot be used as originally intended post‑merger, pursue a cy‑près modification early—advancement and counsel should partner on donor communication before any filing to preserve trust.

You can brief a small set of major donors pre‑announcement under strict NDAs without privileging them over faculty governance or regulators. Use a defined rubric for who is briefed (e.g., top 10% of lifetime commitments and active pledgors), disclose no nonpublic counterparties’ terms, and limit to mission rationale, identity safeguards, and timeline. Record each briefing in counsel’s log.

A Practical Playbook for Philanthropic Integration

Before Announcement (Day 0 Work)

Philanthropic due diligence—parallel to financial. Inventory endowed and restricted funds, bequests in the pipeline, and active foundation grants. Identify potential cy-près risks and draft stewardship language now. Treat this as a distinct workstream with advancement, finance, and counsel at the table from the start.

Quiet briefings with top donors and foundations on both sides. Under confidentiality, preview the rationale, surface donor-intent questions, and invite advice. Ask for early champions willing to speak publicly when the time comes.

Identity protections by design, not promise. Prepare a naming plan (e.g., ‘[Legacy] College at [Acquirer]’), preserve scholarship and reporting lines, and keep alumni-relations continuity for 12-24 months. Publish a short ‘Identity & Intent’ brief on day one that shows, in plain language, how donor purposes are carried forward.

At Announcement

Mission-driven case for support. Lead with the educational value only possible together: new academic pathways, access expansions, regional partnerships, research synergies. Avoid rescue framing. Make the case specific and concrete, tied to programs and outcomes donors care about.

Dedicated ‘Legacy to Impact’ funds with challenge matches. Create visible vehicles that convert anxiety into investment—restricted funds for scholarships, program launches, and student success tied to the integrated entity.

Community-benefit specificity. Spell out local benefits and stakeholder wins (clinics, teacher pipelines, innovation hubs). When people can ‘see’ the upside, they are likelier to invest in it.

First 12-24 Months

Quarterly transparency. Report enrollment in merged programs, first scholarship cohorts, renewed or new foundation grants, and capital milestones. Transparency reduces rumors and builds credibility.

Recognition symmetry. Offer parity for legacy and acquirer donors—naming walls, digital honor rolls, endowed-fund dashboards, and joint stewardship events.

Two-sided cultivation. Brief the acquirer’s major donors so they see strategic growth rather than a charitable drain. Ask two or three to seed a matching pool restricted to merger priorities; matches signal confidence and reduce perceived risk.

Measuring Success Beyond the Closing Date

Because reliable analytics on donor behavior in mergers are sparse, leaders should build their own lightweight evidence base. For each merger, track three years pre- and post-integration for: total private support; alumni participation (where available); number of $1M+ gifts; and the mix of restricted versus unrestricted giving.

Pair quantitative metrics with a qualitative log: Was identity preserved in naming? Did a Legacy Alumni structure exist? Were there donor-intent disputes? Did the acquirer launch dedicated legacy funds? How soon were KPIs reported?

Even a simple dashboard, updated quarterly, changes the conversation with trustees and donors. It shows momentum (or lack thereof), prompts targeted stewardship, and gives leaders permission to make mid-course corrections. It also validates the core claim of this article: philanthropy works best when it is built into planning, not bolted on after the fact.

Conclusion: From Stakeholders to Strategic Partners

The most fundamental error in merger planning is treating donors as communications targets rather than strategic partners. Donors are not merely sources of revenue to be managed; they are partners whose investments reflect belief in institutional mission and values.

Mergers that succeed treat donors, foundations, and alumni as planning inputs, not a downstream audience for PR. Millett’s 1976 study reminds us that while the legal mechanics of endowment transfers are straightforward, the human mechanics are not. Alumni skepticism is predictable; identity needs visible protection through formal structures, not just promises; language and framing carry unusual weight.

When leaders internalize those lessons—and create structures that honor donor intent, invite co-creation, and make the mission upside measurable—legacy becomes leverage rather than liability. Higher education’s financial pressures are real, but so is the reservoir of goodwill that donors and alumni hold for institutions that respect them.

The Sweet Briar alumnae who raised $133 million did not do so because they were told the college would comply with donor intent. They did so because they were invited to co-create a future worth investing in. That is the lesson for every merger: bring philanthropic stakeholders into the room early, build identity protections into the design, launch vehicles that convert anxiety into investment, and report steadily and transparently on what their support makes possible.

That is how two proud legacies become one stronger future—and how the ‘silent stakeholders’ find their voice in shaping it.

Sources (selected): institutional FAQs and press releases (Ursuline–Gannon; DSU–Wesley; UT Southern), RNL Alumni Giving Data 2025 (for participation/attitudes), and Millett, J.D. (1976) ED134105 on college mergers.

Dean Hoke is Managing Partner of Edu Alliance Group, a higher education consultancy. He formerly served as President/CEO of the American Association of University Administrators (AAUA). Dean has worked with higher education institutions worldwide. With decades of experience in higher education leadership, consulting, and institutional strategy, he brings a wealth of knowledge on colleges’ challenges and opportunities. Dean is the Executive Producer and co-host for the podcast series Small College America.