Tag: Edu Alliance

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Higher Education Leadership in Times of Crisis Part II

By Dr. Barry Ryan, September 15, 2025 – In my August 11th article titled ‘Higher Education Leadership in Times of Crisis,” we established that higher education leadership today cannot be solitary work and that effective crisis response requires both internal and external counsel. Now that you’ve assembled (at least thought through) your cast of trusted advisors and recognized the unique leadership demands of your situation, the next critical step is understanding what you’re actually facing—and how to navigate it successfully. Once you recognize that your organization may be entering such a time, there are three key initial questions to ask:

  1. How long can a crisis be expected to last?
  2. What are the effects of crisis on my institution, on my team, on my loved ones, and on me?
  3. What are some healthy and effective ways I can lead during crisis?

First, how long should I expect a “typical” crisis to last?

At first blush, it might seem a little silly to ask how long a crisis lasts. After all, isn’t that inherently unpredictable?

The answer is “yes” and “no.” It may seem a little flippant to say, but the reality is that the length of a crisis depends to a certain degree on how you and those in leadership alongside you respond to it. Your approach and actions may make it longer or shorter than it would have been. Here’s what I mean.

Ignoring a crisis and hoping that it blows over is actually a potential strategy—although not one that I would recommend in most circumstances. But there are some built-in roadblocks in a university’s life cycle, which is divided largely into annual, semester, or quarter segments. These can act, on their own, as speed bumps or detours that might diminish or change the course of a crisis.  

For example, a crisis that is being instigated or aggravated by certain individuals might be relieved to some degree on its own by their departure through retirement, transfer, and so on.  Or a financial crisis might be alleviated by the structural limits on certain types of debt that will be paid off, or the inception of certain grants or gifts that are within sight. But these are, unfortunately, uncommon scenarios, and the timing may be unpredictable.

On a global scale, one might think of Winston Churchill trying to imagine how long World War II might last. As futile as such a task might have been, he did, indeed, play out various scenarios and their likely duration. Although it makes for a great quote and probably captures an important aspect of Churchill’s thinking, he likely did not say, “When you’re going through hell, keep going.” But that’s a good reminder for anyone in crisis.

To grossly generalize, I have found that most institutional crises last between six months and two years. Why is that? The more acute ones require quicker action, and the result is either a solution that addresses the issues promptly and efficiently, in, say, six months, and you can move on to other things. Or, failing to find a speedy solution may end with you moving on. (And I don’t mean this lightly, but the reality is that moving on is not the end of the world.)

Why the two-year time frame, on the other end? Because I’ve found that to be about the maximum time frame that a board, or an accreditor, or a creditor, or even a faculty can endure before a solution is reached. Again, the conclusion of the crisis will either leave you in a happier and stronger position in your institution or leave you seeking happiness and a better position somewhere else. But somewhere between six months and two years is what I have found to be the rough lifespan of an intense crisis. (This is barring, of course, a truly existential crisis as a result of which the institution ceases to exist in its current form. But even that drastic of an outcome can easily take two years or more to unfold.)

Second, what are some of the common effects, and how do you survive them?

For the sake of argument, let’s say you become aware that you are entering a crisis period, whether or not it eventually proves to be an existential one. How do you survive in the intervening six months to two years?

Let’s begin with the effects of a continuing crisis on a leader. The crisis can easily become an enormous distraction for someone who already has too much on their plate. The stress that comes with leadership increases in crisis times, with mental, emotional, and even physical effects. Exhaustion can become a daily (and nightly) companion.  Self-doubt creeps in and steals even more of the leader’s resources.

It sounds trite, but when this happens, don’t forget to take a few deep breaths – physically and metaphorically. 

Draw up a “non-crisis” item list, i.e., things that still need to be done, but aren’t necessarily at the crisis point. Now start divvying them up between and among your fellow leaders, and to their direct reports when possible. This could be an opportune time to help them grow and develop, as well as ease your load.

Along with that, begin to excuse yourself from meetings at which your presence is not absolutely necessary. Only you really know which are and which aren’t. You may still need to attend to some that aren’t technically necessary, but that may prove helpful in crisis-related activities. Again, having trusted substitutes sit in for you for a while can be a growth opportunity for them, and also demonstrate that you trust and empower those with whom you work. When it comes to meetings, which can serve to drain you even more, perhaps adopt a practice of only making limited strategic appearances. Make your participation relevant enough and just long enough to establish your presence and help you – and your colleagues – feel like you’re staying in touch.

Don’t forget to take some days off, or even vacations. Sad but true, don’t make them too long or too far away or somewhere too difficult for you to be reached. You’re probably not really going to relax completely anyway, but you should at least experience some benefit from a change in perspective and place. Frankly, you would do well to consider the health and happiness of your loved ones who’ve been going through this with you, and that they need a break, perhaps even more than you do. After all, you are able to face the crisis more directly, as well as possible enemies, while your loved ones have to suffer vicariously and without the same ability to engage.

Third, how to lead during a crisis?

There is no question that crises have deleterious effects on you, your friends and family, but also your colleagues. You undoubtedly have support and supporters (even though they may seem distant), so don’t neglect them. Their fidelity to the institution and its mission – and you – deserves appreciation and acknowledgement, even if only expressed privately. They’re worried about the institution, but also their livelihood and their colleagues as well. 

When they see you, try not to be the deer in the headlights (a situation that doesn’t usually end well in the wild). Appearing indecisive is uninspiring. But so is being overbearing or angry.

Try to be yourself as you were before the crisis. Remember to smile, relax the muscles of your face and neck, and ask them about their loved ones, their teaching, or their research. Be human. The thoughtful ones have an idea about what you’re feeling and going through, so it’s okay for them to see you as a human. You don’t have to adopt a fake effervescence, but you should avoid moping.

Seek impartial counsel. That may, or may not, include colleagues. A small group of confidants is necessary. External friends who have the courage to be honest with you, and also keep complete confidence, can be your best resource to help you gain and keep perspective. They may have higher ed experience, but not necessarily. I have always found that the best counsel comes from folks who have had real challenges, real losses, survived real attacks, and still kept their heads about them. Ones that are “too perfect” are probably not what you need at this point.

While there is a need for you to seek and obtain trustworthy counsel, you should at the same time try to avoid seeking too much counsel. Bottom line is that you’re a leader and you’re going to have to make difficult decisions. So you should accept counsel, but too much can be confusing and even overwhelming. 

Look, you’re in a tough position and no matter what you do, some people (possibly including some people you respect and care about) are not going to be thrilled. Sad but true. And some of those feelings may change over time, as they come to a fuller perspective as well.

My advice to leaders in crisis situations always includes two elements:

Can you make a decision that allows you to look at yourself in the mirror? 

Then do what you believe is right and let the chips fall where they may. Period.

While you are a leader in a profession you may (or may not any longer) dearly love, there IS an “after.”  That may mean continuing in your post-crisis position in the same post-crisis institution, or it may mean more significant changes for you.  If so, take what you’ve learned along to whatever comes next.  Partings are rarely enjoyable, but I recall a very thoughtful young person we had to let go.  His response was remarkable.  “I want to learn from this experience and become better as a result.” When I saw him at another institution a year later, he came up to me and said that’s exactly what had transpired and that he was grateful.

Your life, and your legacy, are much more than just this current time of crisis within this current institution. Be grateful to those who have earned that gratitude, and remember who you are.

Dr. Barry Ryan is a seasoned higher education executive, legal scholar, and former president of five universities. He is a senior consultant for the Edu Alliance Group and a legal scholar. With more than 25 years of leadership experience, Dr. Ryan has served in numerous roles, including faculty member, department chair, dean, vice president, provost, and chief of staff at state, non-profit, and for-profit universities and law schools. His extensive accreditation experience includes two terms on the WASC Senior College and University Commission (WSCUC), serving a maximum of six years. He is widely recognized for his expertise in governance, accreditation, crisis management, and institutional renewal.

In addition to his academic career, Dr. Ryan ​ served as the Supreme Court Fellow in the chambers of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and is a​ member of numerous federal and state bars. He has contributed extensively to charitable organizations and is experienced in board leadership and large-scale fundraising. He remains a trusted advisor to universities and boards seeking strategic alignment and transformation.

He earned his Ph.D. from the University of California, Santa Barbara, his J.D. from the University of​ California, Berkeley, and his Dipl.GB in international business from the University of Oxford.

Edu Alliance Group, Inc. (EAG), founded in 2014, is an education consulting firm located in Bloomington, Indiana, and Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. We assist higher education institutions worldwide on a variety of mission-critical projects. Our consultants are accomplished leaders who use their experience to diagnose and solve challenges.

EAG has provided consulting and executive search services for over 40 higher education institutions in Australia, Egypt, Georgia, India, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Nigeria, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States.

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Is There a Collaborative Middle Ground Between Mergers and Consortia for the Sustainability of Small Independent Institutions?

July 28, 2025, by Dr. Chet Haskell: The headlines are full of uncertainty for American higher education. “Crisis” is a common descriptor. Federal investigations of major institutions are underway. Severe cuts to university research funding have been announced. The elimination of the Department of Education is moving ahead. Revisions to accreditation processes are being floated. Reductions in student support for educational grants and loans are now law. International students are being restricted.

These uncertainties and pressures affect all higher education, not just targeted elite institutions. In particular, they are likely to exacerbate the fragility of smaller, independent non-profit institutions already under enormous stress. Such institutions, some well-known, others known only locally, will be hard hit particularly hard by the combination of Trump Administration pressures and the developing national demographic decline for traditional-age students.(https://www.highereddive.com/news/decline-high-school-graduates-demographic-cliff-wiche-charts/738281/) These small colleges have been a key element of the American higher education scene, as well as for numerous local communities, for many decades.

It is widely understood that the vibrancy of American higher education comes, in part, from the diversity of its institutions and educational goals. The rich mixture of American colleges and universities is a strength that many other nations lack. Students have opportunities to start and stop their educations, to change directions and academic goals, to move among different types of institutions.

Smaller undergraduate colleges play important roles in this non-systemic system. They provide focused educational opportunities for younger adults, where they can build their lives on broad principles. Impressively large percentages of small college graduates go on to graduate education for various professions. Small colleges provide large numbers of graduates who enter PhD programs and eventually enter the professorate.

There are approximately 1179 accredited private institutions with enrollments of fewer than 3000 students. Of these, 185 have between 3000 and 2000 students. Another 329 have enrollments below 2000 but above 1000. A final 650 institutions have enrollments below 1000. These 1179 institutions students include few wealthy colleges such as Williams, Amherst, Carleton or Pomona, as well as numerous struggling, relatively unknowns.

A basic problem is one of scale. In the absence of significant endowments or other external support, it is very difficult to manage small institutions in a cost effective manner. Institutions with enrollments below 1000 are particularly challenged in this regard. The fundamental economics of small institutions are always challenging, as most are almost completely dependent on student enrollments, a situation getting worse with the coming decline of traditional college age students. There are limited options available to offset this decline. Renewed attention to student retention is one. Another is adding limited graduate programs. However, both take investment, appropriate faculty and staff capacity and time, all of which are often scarce.

These institutions have small endowments measured either in total or per student value. Of the 1179. There are only 80 with total endowments in excess of $200 million. While a handful have per student endowments that rival the largest private universities, (Williams, Amherst and Pomona all have per student endowments in excess of $1.8 million), the vast majority have per student endowments in the $40,000 range and many far less.

Most of these schools have high tuition discount rates, often over 50%, so their net tuition revenue is a fraction of posted expense.  They are all limited by size – economies of scale are difficult to achieve. And most operate in highly competitive markets, where the competition is not only other small schools, but also a range of public institutions.

So, what is the underendowed, under resourced small college to do?

The most common initiatives designed to address these sorts of challenges are consortia, collaborative arrangements among institutions designed to increase student options and to share expenses. There are numerous such arrangements, examples being the Colleges of the Fenway in Boston, the Five Colleges of Western Massachusetts, the Washington DC Metropolitan Area Consortium, and the Claremont Colleges in California, among others.

The particulars of each of these groups differ, but there are commonalities. Most are geographically oriented, seeking to take advantage from being near each other. Typically, these groups want to provide more opportunities for students through allowing cross-registrations, sharing certain academic programs or joint student activities. They usually have arrangements for cost-sharing or cost reductions through shared services  for costs like security services, IT, HR, risk management options, pooled purchasing and the like. In other cases (like the Claremont Consortium) they may share libraries or student athletic facilities. Done well, these arrangements can indeed reduce costs while also attracting potential students through wider access to academic options.

However, it is unlikely that such initiatives, no matter how successful, can fundamentally change the basic financial situation of an independent small college. Such shared services savings are necessary and useful, but usually not sufficient to offset the basic enrollment challenge. The financial impact of most consortia is at the margins.

Furthermore, participating institutions have to be on a solid enough financial basis to take part in the first place. Indeed, a consortium like Claremont is based on financial strength. Two of the members have endowments in excess of $1.2 billion (Pomona’s is $2.8 billion.) The endowments of the others range from a low of $67 million (Keck Graduate with 617 students) to Scripps with $460 million for 1100 students.) The Consortium is of clear value to its members, but none of these institutions is on the brink of failure. Rather, all have strong reputations, a fact that provides another important enrollment advantage.

One important factor in these consortia arrangements is that the participating institutions do not have to give up their independence or modify their missions. Their finances, alumni and accreditation are separate.  And while the nature of the arrangement indicates certain levels of compromise and collaboration, their governance remains basically unchanged with independent fiduciary boards.

At the other end of the spectrum are two radically different situations. One is merging with or being acquired by another institution. Prep Scholar counts 33 such events since 2015. (https://blog.prepscholar.com/permanently-closed-colleges-list). Lacking the resources for financial sustainability, many colleges have had no choice but to take such steps.

Merging or being acquired by a financially stronger institution has many advantages. Faculty and staff jobs may be protected. Students can continue with their studies. The institution being acquired may be able to provide continuity in some fashion within the care of the new owner. Endowed funds may continue. The institution’s name may continue as part of an “institute” or “center” within the new owner’s structure. Alumni records can be maintained. Real estate can be transferred. Debts may be paid off and so forth. There are multiple examples of the acquiring institution doing everything possible along these lines.

But some things end. Independent governance and accreditation cease as those functions are subsumed by the acquiring institution. Administrative and admissions staffs are integrated and some programs, people and activities are shed. Operational leadership changes. And over time, what was once a beloved independent institution may well fade away.

The second situation is, bluntly, oblivion. While there are cases of loyal alumni trying to keep an institution alive with new funding, the landscape is replete with institutions that have failed to be financially sustainable.https://www.insidehighered.com/news/governance/executive-leadership/2025/03/27/how-sweet-briar-college-defied-odds-closure. At least 170 smaller institutions have closed in the past two decades. Significantly, it looks like the rate of closure is increasing, in part because of pressures experienced during the pandemic and in part because of continuing enrollment declines.(https://www.highereddive.com/news/how-many-colleges-and-universities-have-closed-since-2016/539379/)

The end of a college is a very sad thing for all involved and, indeed, for society in general. Often a college is an anchor institution in a small community and the loss is felt widely. The closure of a college is akin to the closure of a local factory. As Dean Hoke and others have noted, this is a particular problem for rural communities.

Are there other possible avenues, something between a consortium and a merger or outright closure?

One relatively new model has been organized by two quite different independent institutions, Otterbein University and Antioch University, that came together in 2022 to create the Coalition for the Common Good. Designed to be more than a simple bilateral partnership, the vision of the Coalition is eventually to include several institutions in different locations linked by a common mission and the capacity to grow collective enrollments.

At its core, the Coalition is based on academic symbiosis. Otterbein is a good example of the high-quality traditional undergraduate residential liberal arts institution. It has been well-run and has modest financial resources. Facing the demographic challenges noted earlier (in a state like Ohio that boasts dozens of such institutions), it developed a set of well-regarded graduate programs, notably in nursing and health-related fields, along with locally based teacher education programs and an MBA. However, despite modest success, they faced the limitations of adult programs largely offered in an on-campus model. Regardless of quality, they lacked the capacity to expand such programs beyond Central Ohio.

Antioch University, originally based in Ohio, had evolved over the past 40 years into a more national institution with locations in California, Washington State and New Hampshire offering a set of graduate professional programs to older adults mostly through distance modalities in hybrid or low-residency forms. Antioch, however, was hampered by limited resources including a very small endowment. It had demonstrated the capacity to offer new programs in different areas and fields but lacked the funds necessary for investment to do so.

Within the Coalition, the fundamental arrangement is for Antioch to take over Otterbein’s graduate programs and, with Otterbein financial support, to expand them in other parts of the country. The goal is significant aggregate enrollment growth and sharing of new revenues. While they plan a shared services operation to improve efficiencies and organizational effectiveness, their primary objective is growth. Antioch seeks to build on Otterbein’s successes, particularly with nursing programs. It already has considerable experience in managing academic programs at a distance, a fact that will be central as it develops the Otterbein nursing and health care programs in a new Antioch Graduate School of Nursing and Health Professions.

It is assumed that additional new members of the Coalition will resemble Otterbein in form, thus further increasing opportunities for growth through enhanced reach and greater scale. New members in other geographic locations will provide additional opportunities for expansion. One early success of the Coalition has been the capacity to offer existing Antioch programs in Central Ohio, including joint partnerships with local organizations, health care and educational systems. Crucially, both institutions remain separately accredited with separate governance and leadership under a Coalition joint  “umbrella” structure.

This is not to assert that this model would work for many other institutions. First, many schools with limited graduate programs will be reluctant to “give up” some or all these programs to another partner in the same fashion as Otterbein has with Antioch. Others may not fit geographically, being too remote for expansion of existing programs. Still others may not wish to join a group with an avowed social justice mission.  Finally, as with some consortia, the Coalition arrangement assumes a certain degree of institutional financial stability – it cannot work for institutions on the brink of financial disaster, lest the weakest institution drag down the others.

Are there other organizational variants that are more integrated than consortia, but allow the retention of their independence in ways impossible in a merger or acquisition model? What can be learned from the Coalition initiative that might help others? How might such middle-ground collaboration models be encouraged and supported?

How can philanthropy help?

This is an opportunity for the segments of the philanthropic world to consider possible new initiatives to support the small college elements of the education sector. While there will always be efforts to gain foundation support for individual colleges, there will never be enough money to buttress even a small portion of deserving institutions that face the financial troubles discussed above

Philanthropy should take a sectoral perspective. One key goal should be to find ways to support  smaller institutions in general. Instead of focusing on gifts to particular institutions, those interested in supporting higher education should look at the multiple opportunities for forms of collaborative or collective action. Central to this effort should be exploration of ways of supporting diverse collaborative initiatives. One example would be to provide sufficient backing to a struggling HBCU or women’s college to enable it to be sufficiently stable to participate in a multi-institutional partnership.

As noted, institutional consortia are well established as one avenue for such collaboration. Consortia have existed for many years. There are consortia-based associations that encourage and support consortia efforts. However, every consortium is unique in its own ways, as participating institutions have crafted a specific initiative of a general model to meet their particular situations and need. Consortia can be important structures for many institutions and should be encouraged.

But there is a large middle ground between consortia arrangements and mergers and acquisitions. The Coalition for the Common Good is but one such arrangement and it is still in its early stages. What has been learned from the experience thus far that might be of use to other institutions and groups? How might this middle ground be explored further for the benefit of other institutions?

One thing learned from the Coalition is the complexity of developing a new model for collective action.  Antioch and Otterbein separately pursued individual explorations of options for two or more years before determining that their partnership together should move forward. It then took a full year to get to the point of announcing their plans and another year to complete negotiations and sign completed legal documents and to obtain the necessary accreditor, regulator and Department of Education approvals. The actual implementation of their plans is still in a relatively early stage. In short, it takes time.

It also takes tremendous effort by leadership on both sides, as they must work closely together while continuing to address the daily challenges of their separate institutions. Everyone ends up with at least two major jobs. Communication is vital. Boards must continue to be supportive. The engagement of faculty and staff takes time and can be costly.

What is often referred to as “fit” – the melding of cultures and attitudes at both the institutional and individual levels – is essential. People must be able to work together for shared goals. The burdens of accreditation, while necessary, are time-consuming and multifaceted. There are many things that can go wrong. Indeed, there are examples of planned and announced mergers or collaborations that fall apart before completion.

Philanthropic institutions could support this work in numerous ways, first for specific initiatives and then for the sector, by providing funding and expertise to facilitate new forms of coalitions. These could include:

  • Providing financial support for the collaborative entity. While participating institutions eventually share the costs of creating the new arrangement, modest dedicated support funding could be immensely useful for mitigating the impact of legal expenses, due diligence requirements, initial management of shared efforts and expanded websites.
  • Providing support for expert advice. The leaders of two institutions seeking partnership need objective counsel on matters financial, legal, organizational, accreditation and more. Provision of expertise for distance education models is often a high priority, since many small colleges have limited experience with these.
  • Funding research. There are multiple opportunities for research and its dissemination. What works? What does not? How can lessons learned by disseminated?
  • Supporting communication through publications, workshops, conferences and other venues.
  • Developing training workshops for boards, leadership, staff and faculty in institutions considering collaborations.
  • Crafting a series of institutional incentives through seed grant awards to provide support for institutions just beginning to consider these options.
  • These types of initiatives might be separate, or they might be clustered into a national center to support and promote collaboration.

These and other ideas could be most helpful to many institutions exploring collaboration. Above all, it is important to undertake such explorations before it is too late, before the financial situation becomes so dire that there are few, if any, choices.

Conclusions

This middle ground is not a panacea. The harsh reality is that not all institutions can be saved. It takes a certain degree of stability and a sufficient financial base to even consider consortia or middle ground arrangements like the Coalition for the Common Good. Merging with or being acquired by stronger institutions is not a worst-case scenario – there are often plenty of reasons, not just financial, that this form of change makes great sense for a smaller, weaker institution.

It is also important for almost all institutions, even those with significant endowment resources, to be thinking about possible options. The stronger the institution, the stronger the resistance to such perspectives is likely to be. There are examples of wealthy undergraduate institutions with $1 billion endowments that are losing significant sums annually in their operating budgets. Such endowments often act like a giant pillow, absorbing the institutional challenges and preventing boards and leaders from facing difficult decisions until it may be too late. Every board should be considering possible future options.

In the face of likely government rollbacks of support, the ongoing demographic challenges for smaller institutions and the general uncertainties in some circle about the importance of higher education itself, independent private higher education must be more creative and assertive about its future. Also, it is essential to remember that the existential financial challenges facing these institutions predate the current Presidential Administration and certainly will remain once it has passed into history.

Just trying to compete more effectively for enrollments will not be sufficient. Neither will simply reducing expense budgets. New collaborative models are needed. Consortia have roles to play. The example of the Coalition for the Common Good may show new directions forward. Anyone who supports the diversity of American higher education institutions should work to find new ways of assuring financial stability while adhering to academic principles and core missions.

Chet Haskell is an independent higher education consultant. Most recently, he was Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs and University Provost at Antioch University and Vice President for Graduate Programs of the Coalition for the Common Good.